Plata o Plomo: Effect of Mexican Transnational Criminal Organizations on the American Criminal Justice System by McPherson, Mark M.
St. Mary's Law Journal
Volume 49 | Number 2 Article 5
2018
Plata o Plomo: Effect of Mexican Transnational
Criminal Organizations on the American Criminal
Justice System
Mark M. McPherson
St. Mary's University School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal
Part of the Courts Commons, Criminal Law Commons, Criminal Procedure Commons, Human
Rights Law Commons, Immigration Law Commons, International Law Commons, Judges
Commons, Jurisprudence Commons, Law and Society Commons, Law Enforcement and
Corrections Commons, Legal History Commons, Legal Remedies Commons, National Security
Law Commons, State and Local Government Law Commons, Supreme Court of the United States
Commons, and the Transnational Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the St. Mary's Law Journals at Digital Commons at St. Mary's University. It has been accepted
for inclusion in St. Mary's Law Journal by an authorized editor of Digital Commons at St. Mary's University. For more information, please contact
jlloyd@stmarytx.edu.
Recommended Citation
Mark M. McPherson, Plata o Plomo: Effect of Mexican Transnational Criminal Organizations on the American Criminal Justice System, 49






PLATA O PLOMO: EFFECT OF MEXICAN 
TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
ORGANIZATIONS ON THE AMERICAN 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
MARK M. MCPHERSON* 
   I.  Introduction ............................................................................................ 462 
  II.  Evolution of Mexican Transnational Criminal 
  Organizations .......................................................................................... 464 
A. From Alcohol Smuggling to Marijuana ....................................... 464 
B. From Marijuana to Cocaine .......................................................... 466 
C. From Cocaine to Human Smuggling ........................................... 468 
D. From Cartel to Quasi-State ........................................................... 469 
E. Transnational Criminal Organization Designation .................... 470 
F. Plata O Plomo As a Business Model ........................................... 471 
III.  Effects of the Mexican Drug Cartels on the United States 
Criminal Justice System ......................................................................... 472 
A. A Macro Effect ............................................................................... 472 
B. A Micro Effect – Forced Participation in Crime ....................... 474 
 
*  The author would like to thank Professor John Schmolesky for his suggestions and advice; 
Professor Patricia Stubblefield (Se. Ok. State Univ.) for starting him down this path eighteen years ago; 
and the St. Mary’s Law Journal staff for their edits.  The author is eternally grateful to his wife, Maria 
Aurora, for her sacrifice and understanding throughout law school, especially during this endeavor.  
Lastly, the author would like to thank A.M.M. and L.M.M. for their loving support; he hopes this will 
inspire them to always keep learning. 
1
McPherson: Plata o Plomo
Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2018
  
462 ST. MARY’S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 49:461 
IV.  Defining, Analyzing, and Utilizing the Affirmative Defenses  
of Necessity and Duress ....................................................................... 475 
A. Federal Jurisprudence Definition of Duress and 
 Necessity Defenses ......................................................................... 475 
B. Analyzing the Defenses of Duress and Necessity ..................... 481 
  1. Duress ........................................................................................ 481 
  2. Necessity ................................................................................... 492 
C. Utilizing Duress and Necessity Defenses ................................... 495 
  1. Utilizing Duress and Necessity Defenses at Trial ............... 495 
  2. Utilizing Duress and Necessity During 
   Sentencing ................................................................................. 501 
  V.  Viability of a Duress or Necessity Defense Going Forward ........... 503 
A. Is a Duress Defense Viable? ......................................................... 503 
B. Is a Necessity Defense Viable? ..................................................... 508 
C. Arguments for Change ................................................................... 509 
  1. Shifting the Burden of Persuasion ........................................ 510 
  2. Allowing the Necessity Defense ............................................ 514 
VI.  Conclusion .............................................................................................. 516 
 
I.    INTRODUCTION 
A young man named Roberto1 is walking home from the bus stop in his 
hometown of Nuevo Laredo, a border town located in Northern Mexico.  
Roberto has just finished a shift at a large maquiladora2 where his meager 
salary is just enough to feed and provide modest shelter for his wife and 
small child.  As Roberto walks down the dusty path to his small home he 
is forced off the road by a group of men in a black double-cab pickup 
truck with spinners.  The men abruptly exit the vehicle and ask Roberto 
how his wife, Lupita, and son are doing.  Roberto, who has never seen 
 
1. Roberto is a fictional character and the story is a fictional account.  Names, characters, 
businesses, places, events and incidents are either the product of the author’s imagination or used in a 
fictitious manner.  Any resemblances to actual persons, living or dead, or actual events are purely 
coincidental. 
2. A maquiladora is the Spanish word for a manufacturing plant that takes advantage of 
decreased costs through export and import labor to decrease costs under a “value-added” basis.  
Maquiladora, ENCY. BRITANNICA (2017). 
2
St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 49 [2018], No. 2, Art. 5
https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol49/iss2/5
  
2018] COMMENT 463 
these men before, briefly wonders how the men know about his family 
before nervously stating he does not want any trouble and politely 
attempting to excuse himself from their presence.  The men flash pistols 
and inform Roberto that he must follow their instructions if he wants his 
family to live.  Roberto must meet them in two days at an abandoned 
house located several miles outside the town.  He must also keep this 
encounter to himself, or else suffer the consequences.  The men drive 
away, leaving Roberto wondering how he could possibly protect his family.  
With no confidence in the police force and no place to hide, Roberto 
follows the men’s instructions.  When Roberto arrives at the abandoned 
house he is met by a large group of men holding what appear to be 
automatic rifles.  Inside the house, the smell of marijuana permeates the 
air.  Roberto observes book-sized packages wrapped in duct tape being 
loaded into cheap backpacks by three men that look scared and dispirited.  
Roberto is given a backpack and instructed to pack it with as many 
bundles as will fit inside.  Roberto and the other “mules” are then marched 
to the edge of the Rio Grande River and instructed to cross to the other 
side where they are to be met by someone who will provide further 
instructions.  Roberto and the men do as they are told and cross the river.  
Within an hour, Roberto is apprehended by the United States Border 
Patrol and charged with possession with intent to distribute a controlled 
substance.   
Based on the facts above, Roberto will have an excellent defense of 
duress. Or will he?  Will the prosecutor buy his story and decline to 
prosecute?  Does Roberto’s fact scenario meet the elements the United 
States Supreme Court has determined are necessary to present a duress 
defense?  Will a jury believe Roberto when presented with hard evidence 
and testimony from a U.S. agent stating that Roberto is responsible for 
bringing drugs into the United States? 
Roberto has several options as his case proceeds through the criminal 
justice system: (1) he can plead guilty and ask for mercy from the court;3 
(2) he can present the story to the prosecutor and hope for use of 
prosecutorial discretion; or (3) he can plead not guilty, go to trial and 
attempt to present a duress defense to a jury.4  Is the duress defense usable 
 
3. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(a)(1) (“A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, or (with the court’s 
consent) nolo contendere.”). 
4. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (delineating an individual’s right to a speedy trial by a jury of his 
or her peers). 
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in this situation, and if not, what other options are available for Roberto in 
the alternative?  This question will be explored below.   
In Part II, a history of the Mexican drug cartels’ evolution into 
transnational criminal organizations (“TCOs”) is presented.5  The Mexican 
cartels’ business model of plata o plomo is also discussed, along with the 
theory that the business model is so effective that individuals such as 
Roberto have no choice but to comply with the demands of the cartel.  In 
Part III, the effect of the Mexican cartels on the United States criminal 
justice system is examined.6  Furthermore, the correlation between the 
evolution of the cartels and the increase in drug and immigration 
prosecutions in the United States is analyzed.7  This Comment then delves 
into a narrower, more specific legal issue that arises when the Mexican 
cartels force individuals to participate in crime.8  In Part IV, the history 
and current state of the duress defense in the United States is explored.9  
Part V begins with an analysis of whether a duress defense is legally viable 
for a defendant who claims a Mexican cartel forced him to commit a 
crime.10  Part V then concludes by arguing that changes in the law may 
make a claim of duress more viable for defendants who are forced into the 
commission of crimes.11 
II.    EVOLUTION OF MEXICAN TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
ORGANIZATIONS 
A.    From Alcohol Smuggling to Marijuana 
In order to understand the effects that Mexican cartels have on the 
United States criminal justice system, it is important to realize the 
magnitude and reach of these organizations.  In order to realize the 
magnitude of these organizations it is important to understand where they 
came from.   
Recently, United States District Court Judge Andrew Hanen, sitting in 
the Southern District of Texas Brownsville division, wrote in a published 
opinion, that “[Mexican] cartels initiate and control the vast majority of the 
 
5. Infra, Part II. 
6. Infra, Part III. 
7. Infra, Part III. 
8. Infra, Part III. 
9. Infra, Part IV. 
10. Infra, Part V.A. 
11. Infra, Part V.C. 
4
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drug trade, illegal cash and weapons smuggling, and human trafficking 
facing Mexico and the United States.”12  Judge Hanen’s statement was 
validated by the Drug Enforcement Administration in the 2015 National 
Drug Threat Assessment Summary, which found that the main suppliers 
of narcotics to the United States are the Mexican transnational criminal 
organizations.13  However, Mexican cartels have not always been powerful 
enough to be designated as TCOs.  The powerful and violent Mexican 
TCOs came from humble beginnings. 
In 1848, the Rio Grande River was established as the international 
boundary between the United States and Mexico under the Treaty of 
Guadalupe-Hidalgo.14  Shortly after the establishment of the international 
boundary, individuals began smuggling goods from the United States to 
Mexico and vice versa.15  In 1919, with the implementation of the 
Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution, the United States outlawed 
the production, sale, and transport of alcohol.16  However, even though 
the U.S. Government had banned alcohol, the American public still 
thirsted for it, which in turn led to the creation of a black market and a 
need for smugglers of the illegal substance.  Smuggling alcohol soon 
became a profitable profession that rapidly proliferated.17  Fourteen years 
later, the Eighteenth Amendment was repealed,18 but the professional 
smuggling network that had been created stayed intact and quickly found 
other illicit goods to replace alcohol.19  The smuggling networks that were 
 
12. United States v. Ramirez, 38 F. Supp. 3d 818, 826 (S.D. Tex. 2014). 
13. DRUG ENF’T ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE, DEA-DCT-DIR-008-16, 2015 NATIONAL 
DRUG THREAT ASSESSMENT SUMMARY iii (2015). 
14. Amy White, History of Smuggling, TEX. LIBERAL ARTS, http://www.laits.utexas.edu/jaime/ 
cwp4/esg/smugglehistory.html [https://perma.cc/P946-DUA3]. 
15. Id. 
16. See id. (“The smuggling of alcohol in the United States from Mexico did not become 
hugely popular until the Prohibition Act of 1919 in the United States, which outlawed both the 
production and consumption of alcohol products.”); see also U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, §§ 1–3 
(repealed 1933) (prohibiting the production and sale of alcohol in the United States). 
17. White, supra note 14. 
18. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 1. 
19. See Arthur Rizer, Hannibal at the Gate: Border Kids, Drugs, and Guns – and the Mexican Cartel 
War Goes On, 27 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 48, 55 (2015) (“By then end of the 1960s, Mexican criminal 
gangs had assumed control of the smuggling routes and infrastructure necessary to ship opium, 
marijuana, and domestically produced heroin to the Western United States.”). 
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created to smuggle bootleg tequila are considered the forbearers of the 
Mexican cartel.20   
B.    From Marijuana to Cocaine 
After the prohibition era, the smuggling routes used for smuggling 
alcohol were repurposed for the illegal transportation of marijuana and 
“poppy” into the United States.21  Small, localized criminal groups 
continued to control and profit from these routes through the early 
1980’s.22  During that same time, the United States war on drugs was 
focused on interdicting the importation of cocaine from Colombia that 
was being smuggled through the Caribbean.23  As a consequence of those 
efforts, the United States began to successfully close off the Caribbean 
routes, which in turn forced the Colombian cartels to rely on the Mexican 
corridor to get their product into the United States.24  As a result, the 
small local groups smuggling marijuana into the United States began to see 
increased profits as they incorporated cocaine smuggling into their 
repertoire.25  Through these changes, the Mexican cartels, as they are 
recognized today, began to take shape.26 
 
20. See Michael E. Martínez Peña, Organized Crime Growth and Sustainment: A Review of 
the Influence of Popular Religion and Beliefs in Mexico 48–49 (Mar. 2016) (unpublished M.A. thesis, 
Naval Postgraduate School) (on file with the St. Mary’s Law Journal) (citing JUAN RAMÍREZ-
PIMIENTA, CANTAR A LOS NARCOS: VOCES Y VERSOS DEL NARCOCORRIDO [SINGING TO THE 
NARCOS: VOICES AND VERSES OF THE NARCOCORRIDO] 20 (Federal District, Mexico: Temas De 
Hoy, 2011)) (“The [Thirteenth Amendment], also called the ‘dry law,’ lasted until 1933 and resulted 
in the illegal importation of alcohol from . . . Mexico . . . .  On the repeal of [the Thirteenth 
Amendment] in 1933, drug smuggling became the primary illegal trade . . . .”). 
21. See Martín Paredes, The Evolution of the Mexican Narcos, EL PASO NEWS (Jan. 7, 2016), 
https://epn.xyz/2016/01/07/the-evolution-of-the-mexican-narcos/ [https://perma.cc/F7ET-989S] 
(noting Mexico has been home to many drug smugglers, and “[e]ach of them ran heroin and 
marihuana individually through the territories they each controlled”); see also Peña, supra note 20 
(acknowledging the end of prohibition lead to the development of the drug trade). 
22. Paredes, supra note 21. 
23. Id. 
24. Id. 
25. See STEVEN DUDLEY, TRANSNATIONAL CRIME IN MEXICO AND CENTRAL AMERICA: 
ITS EVOLUTION AND ROLE IN INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION 4 (Migration Pol’y Inst. eds., 2012), 
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/publications/RMSG-TransnationalCrime.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/GUD8-R6GM] (discussing the development of the cartels after the introduction 
of cocaine to the list of smuggled goods). 
26. See id. (observing cocaine was initially distributed through the Mexican criminal 
organizations that “included the beginnings of what would later become known as the Sinaloa, 
Tijuana, Juarez, and Gulf cartels”). 
6
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Commentators have used the term cartel to describe Mexican drug 
trafficking organizations.27  Arguably, Mexican cartels are not cartels in 
the true sense of the word, as it does not appear that they are attempting 
to artificially control the pricing of their products.28  Regardless, however, 
for purposes of this Comment, that distinction is irrelevant.  Historians 
have traced the major Mexican cartels (with the exception of the Gulf and 
Zetas Cartels) back to one cartel—the Guadalajara Cartel.29  Over time, 
the Guadalajara Cartel splintered into several groups that formed the 
beginning of today’s major cartels.30  At the outset, these groups generally 
operated in areas that were broken up by geographical boundaries within 
Mexico, referred to as plazas.31  Each group owned and operated the 
smuggling routes in their respective geographical zones that were 
established back in the days of prohibition.32  The Mexican cartels 
controlled what happened in their plazas by paying bribes to the politicians 
and police forces found in their geographical zones.33  If the politicians or 
police refused bribes to cooperate, the cartels simply enforced their will 
through the use of violence.34  Early in this time period, the major cartels 
were content with operating their plazas and reaping the profits generated 
from smuggling drugs.35  However, this soon changed with the 
militarization of the cartels.36 
 
27. Paredes, supra note 21. 
28. See id. (“A cartel is an association of manufacturers or suppliers that artificially control 
pricing . . . .  The Mexican drug organizations, for the most part, do not control the manufacture or 
distribution of the illicit drugs but instead act as conduits from the source to the final destination.”).   
29. See id. (“Mexican drug cartels evolved through familial, or blood ties directly from the 
Guadalajara cartel, all from family members originating in Sinaloa.”).  
30. See id. (“It also makes it easier to understand the constant evolution of the gangs as part of 
[] ever changing loyalties among the criminals that evolved from the Guadalajara drug cartel into over 
20 drug gangs and two-to-three drug trafficking organizations operating in Mexico today.”).   
31. See DUDLEY, supra note 25, at 5 (“Plazas signify a territory controlled by a gang . . . .”); 
Paredes, supra note 21 (“Mexico has had many drug smugglers, each controlling their own routes into 
the United States.”). 
32. See Paredes, supra note 21 (discussing the various drug routes used by traffickers); see also 
Peña, supra note 20 (discussing the development of the drug trade following the end of prohibition). 
33. Id. 
34. See id. (examining the use of intimidation to control a plaza). 
35. See DUDLEY, supra note 25, at 4–5 (describing the early history of the cartels as “small, 
family-based organizations”). 
36. See id. (militarizing the cartels transformed them from smuggling organizations to 
sophisticated criminal organizations). 
7
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C.    From Cocaine to Human Smuggling 
In the late 1990’s, the Gulf Cartel began to hire deserted military special 
forces soldiers to provide protection for their smuggling routes, and to 
enforce their organizational goals.37  The Gulf Cartel soon realized that by 
employing their own personal army, it was possible to encroach on the 
other cartels’ plazas—effectively co-opting, or outright stealing, other 
cartels’ established smuggling routes.38  At the same time that the Gulf 
Cartel began expanding their geographic area of operation, they (along 
with other cartels) also began to expand into other areas of crime.39  
Crimes such as kidnapping, theft and resale of oil and gas, and weapons 
smuggling soon became part of the illicit activities that the cartels were 
profiting from.40  Another area that the cartels took a high interest in was 
human smuggling.41 
Human smuggling organizations, like the early alcohol smuggling 
groups, were typically run by small, criminal organizations.42  These 
organizations charged money in exchange for a guide, or “coyote,” to 
bring persons into the United States illegally.43  As the cartels expanded 
their criminal organizations, they took over human smuggling groups 
either directly by operating them, or indirectly by forcing the smaller 
groups to pay a “piso” (tax) to operate in the cartel’s area.44  Human 
smuggling organizations often engaged in practices such as holding the 
smuggled individual against their will until the individual’s family paid 
 
37. See DAVID A. SHIRK, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, THE DRUG WAR IN 
MEXICO 10 (2011) (describing the Zetas as “a paramilitary enforcer group comprising elite former 
military forces recruited by the Gulf Cartel”).   
38. DUDLEY, supra note 25, at 5. 
39. Id. 
40. Damon Tabor, Radio Tecnico: How The Zetas Cartel Took Over Mexico With Walkie-Talkies, 
POPULAR SCIENCE (Mar. 25, 2014), http://www.popsci.com/article/technology/radio-tecnico-how-
zetas-cartel-took-over-mexico-walkie-talkies [https://perma.cc/W6XR-ERA8]. 
41. Id. 
42. Kyra Gurney, Mexico Human Trafficking Web Exposes Changing Role of Cartels, INSIGHT 
CRIME (July 31, 2014), http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/human-trafficking-drug-cartels-
mexico [https://perma.cc/GEX2-A9A7]. 
43. DUDLEY, supra note 25, at 14–15. 
44. Id. at 14; see also Ana Davila, Drug Cartels: Where Human Trafficking and Human Smuggling Meet 
Today, THE HUFFINGTON POST (June 16, 2016), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ana-davila/drug-
cartels-where-human-trafficking-and-human-smuggling-meet-today_b_7588408.html [https://perma. 
cc/AVC5-QVKJ] (reporting the absorption or destruction of smaller human trafficking organizations 
by major cartels). 
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additional fees.45  However, the cartels upped the ante by using smuggled 
individuals to supplement their work force.46  There is documented 
evidence that cartels have forced people to smuggle drugs into the United 
States, and have executed them if they refused to participate.47   
D.    From Cartel to Quasi-State 
From their humble beginning of smuggling tequila, discussed in 
Section A above,48  Mexican cartels have grown from organizations with 
influence, primarily in Mexico, to multi-billion dollar organizations with 
influence and operations all over the world.49   
In some areas in Mexico, the cartels’ act as quasi-states.50  In those 
areas, the Mexican government is incapable or unwilling to confront the 
groups.51  The cartels have their own military,52 communication 
networks,53 and language.54  They use weapons that are the kind and 
grade deployed by national militaries.55  In 2009 (the last year that the 
National Drug Assessment provided a profit estimate), the United States 
Department of Justice estimated the Mexican cartels’ gross profits to be as 
high as thirty-nine billion dollars a year.56  That amount is higher than the 
 
45. DUDLEY, supra note 25, at 14. 
46. Id. at 16. 
47. Id.  
48.   Supra, Part II.A. 
49. Money, Guns, and Drugs: Are U.S. Inputs Fueling Violence on the U.S.–Mexico Border?  Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Nat’l Sec. and Foreign Affairs of the Comm. On Oversight and Gov’t Reform, 
111th Cong. 33, 35 (2009) [hereinafter Money, Guns, and Drugs] (statement of Michael A. Braun, 
Managing Partner, Spectre Group International, LLC).  
50. See SHIRK, supra note 37, at 3 (“[S]ome [cartels] capitalize on antigovernment sentiments 
and have operational control of certain limited geographical areas.”). 
51. See Tabor, supra note 40 (“[Zetas] operate with such impunity that their authority eclipsed 
that of the Mexican government itself.”). 
52. See SHIRK, supra note 37, at 10 (stating the Gulf Cartel was the first cartel to hire former 
Mexican special forces soldiers). 
53. Tabor, supra note 40 (“[The Zetas] understood that a widespread communications system 
would provide a crucial competitive edge over other cartels.”). 
54. See Ken Ellingwood, Grim Glossary of the Narco-world, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 28, 2009), 
http://www.latimes.com/la-fg-narco-glossary28-2009oct28-story.html [https://perma.cc/X8RR-
84M3] (listing Mexican media’s vocabulary of Mexican Cartel actions); see also JOINT PUBL’N 
RESEARCH SERV. REPORT, JPRS-LAM-89-002, LATIN AMERICA REFERENCE AID: GLOSSARY OF 
SPANISH AND PORTUGUESE NARCOTICS TERMS (1989) (cataloging words used as code words by the 
cartel in order to disguise their conversations). 
55. See SHIRK, supra note 37 (detailing the types of weapons used by cartels). 
56. NAT’L DRUG ADMIN. INTELLIGENCE CTR., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRODUCT NO. 
2008-Q0317-005, 2009 NATIONAL DRUG THREAT ASSESSMENT III (2009). 
9
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gross domestic product of over 100 countries in the world.57  The 
Mexican cartels also have their own intelligence networks that watch and 
report on everything that happens in the area.58  The networks are so 
advanced and complete that the cartels know everything that is happening 
in the areas that fall under their respective geographical purview.59  In 
many areas of Mexico, the cartels are better informed than the government 
as to what is happening in a town or city.60  In Nuevo Laredo, 
Tamaulipas, Mexico, the Zetas Cartel infiltrated the city police force to 
such an extent that they controlled the city’s emergency response.61  As a 
result, the Zetas gained the ability to track and control all aspects of daily 
life.62  All of this control and manipulation, creates a reality where citizens 
are unable to turn to their government for intervention and have little 
choice but to try and avoid the cartels.63 
E.    Transnational Criminal Organization Designation 
As discussed above, the major Mexican cartels have expanded their 
involvement from narcotics smuggling to any manner of crime that will 
result in a profit.64  A Transnational Criminal Organization is defined by 
the United States Government as an organization that conducts illegal and 
legal operations across national borders in order to obtain monetary gains, 
 
57. See Economy > GDP: Countries Compared, NATIONMASTER, http://www.nationmaster.com/ 
country-info/stats/Economy/GDP#2009 [https://perma.cc/5SWC-UBDN] (ranking all the 
countries in the world by gross domestic product); see also CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE CIA 
WORLD FACTBOOK 2010 (2010) (providing gross domestic product for every nation in the world).  
58. See George W. Grayson, Los Zetas: The Ruthless Army Spawned by a Mexican Drug Cartel, 
FOREIGN POL’Y RES. INST. (May 13, 2008), http://www.fpri.org/article/2008/05/los-zetas-the-
ruthless-army-spawned-by-a-mexican-drug-cartel/ [https://perma.cc/383P-EG2E] (describing the 
complex system of workers that alert cartel members about day-to-day activities). 
59. See Tabor, supra note 40 (noting the cartels have a multitude of informants, including, shoe 
shiners, taxi drivers, taco vendors, and police officers). 
60. See id. (“The [Zetas] developed a Stasi-like army of spies and integrated technology and 
social media . . . .  The result . . . was an intelligence network ‘without equal in the Americas.’”). 
61. Id. 
62. See id. (describing the sophisticated network of informants at the cartel’s disposal) 
63. See Carrie F. Cordero, Breaking the Mexican Cartels: A Key Homeland Security Challenge for the 
Next Four Years, 81 UMKC L. REV. 289, 292 (2012) (indicating officials and citizens have little choice 
but to cooperate with the cartels or face death). 
64. See, e.g., Tabor, supra note 40 (discussing the expansion of the Gulf Cartel “into 
prostitution and gambling along the Rio Grande, building out a small but profitable criminal 
enterprise”). 
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power, and influence.65  The definition further provides that these groups 
proactively protect their operations through the use of violence and 
corruption.66  The United States Government has acknowledged the 
growth of the Mexican cartels into TCOs and has started designating them 
as such.67  Currently, there are at least eight Mexican cartels that the 
United States Government has designated as such.68  This designation is a 
recognition by the United States Government that the groups pose a threat 
to the security of the United States.69  As will be discussed below, these 
groups also affect the United States criminal justice system.70   
F.    Plata O Plomo As a Business Model 
In the late 1970’s, the Colombian cartels were the main suppliers of 
cocaine to the United States.71  The Colombian cartels, particularly the 
Medellín Cartel run by Pablo Escobar, were highly successful in running 
their drug smuggling organizations through the use of a business model 
known as plata o plomo—silver or lead.72  Plata o plomo is a Faustian choice 
of being paid a bribe (silver) to participate in a criminal organization or, in 
the alternative, participating under the threat of being shot and killed 
(lead).73  Mexican cartels have adopted the plata o plomo business model, 
which has proved to be effective in developing their organizations.74 
 




67. Tom Barry, Transnational Criminal Organizations and Mexico’s Drug Wars, BORDER LINES 
BLOG (June 24, 2011), http://borderlinesblog.blogspot.co.uk/2011/06/transnational-criminal-
organizations.html [https://perma.cc/9AEG-DTZG]. 
68. DRUG ENF’T ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE, DEA-DCT-DIR-065-15, UNITED STATES: 
AREAS OF INFLUENCE OF MAJOR MEXICAN TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL ORGANIZATIONS 2 
(2015). 
69. Barry, supra note 67. 
70.    Infra, Part III. 
71. Scott Stewart, From Colombia to New York City: The Narconomics of Cocaine, BUS. INSIDER 
(June 27, 2016, 8:50 AM), http://www.businenessinsider.com/from-colombia-to-new-york-city-the-
economics-of-cocaine-2015-7?IR=T [https://perma.cc/2K8Y-JUGK]. 
72. Paredes, supra note 21. 
73. Id. 
74. See Lynn Vincent, Border Wars, WORLD MAG. (Mar. 28, 2009), https://world. 
wng.org/2009/03/border_wars [https://perma.cc/DYA5-JVU8] (reporting law enforcement in 
Mexico is impotent against the cartels due to their use of the plata o plomo business model). 
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III.    EFFECTS OF THE MEXICAN DRUG CARTELS ON THE 
UNITED STATES CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
As discussed above, the Mexican cartels have evolved into TCOs that 
are involved in every area of criminal activity.75  In some geographical 
areas of Mexico, the cartels operate as quasi-governments.76  This ability 
to control and manipulate all aspects of the cartels’ adopted geographical 
areas, affects citizens of those areas through their inability to do anything 
other than cooperate with the cartels.77  The effects of the Mexican 
cartels, however, are not limited to Mexico.78  Mexican cartels also have 
an effect in the United States in many ways and on different levels.79  
Specifically, their effects on the United States criminal justice system can 
be seen at both the macro and micro level.  This section will briefly discuss 
the macro effects before turning to the micro effects.   
A.    A Macro Effect 
The Mexican cartels’ total domination of both drug and human 
smuggling into the U.S. has had a profound impact on the country’s 
criminal justice system.80  This impact can be seen in such things as 
spillover violence, criminal dockets, and prison population explosions.81  
 
75.    See Tabor, supra note 40 (recognizing cartels are involved with not only narcotics, but also 
prostitution and gambling). 
76.    See id. (acknowledging Mexico’s Gulf Cartel “formed its own paramilitary unit . . . to seize 
territory and dispatch rivals”). 
77.    See Cordero, supra note 63, at 292 (“When the choice is to cooperate, or face death of 
oneself or one’s family, there really is no choice.”); Paredes, supra note 21 (noting cartels provide 
citizens with only two options: “submit to the will of the smuggler and benefit from their money or 
die opposing them”).  
78.    See Tabor, supra note 40 (explaining how a cartel built its drug empire, spanning across 
Mexico and into the United States, by smuggling drugs worth several billions of dollars into the 
United States). 
79.    Cordero, supra note 63, at 292–96 (2012) (indicating some families on the U.S. side of the 
border “periodically need to hide or evacuate to avoid cross-border gunfire,” others have been 
kidnapped or killed, and noting a number of U.S. officers who protect the border have been 
corrupted by cartels). 
80.    See generally Money, Guns, and Drugs, supra note 49 (discussing factors that impact the U.S. 
justice system such as: how those involved in the drug and human smuggling between Mexico and 
the U.S. will face an adversarial judicial system, which they are not accustomed to; the need for more 
crime labs; and the increase in kidnappings and killings). 
81.    Compare JAN CHAIKEN & DOUGLAS MCDONALD, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ-
111763, DRUG LAW VIOLATORS, 1980–86 at 5 (Frank D. Balog ed., 1988) (noting the number of 
offenders incarcerated for drug offenses was only 71% of those convicted in 1980), with MARK 
MOTIVANS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ 248470, FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 2012 
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It has, however, been acknowledged that the American populace’s desire 
for drugs contributes to a large extent to the presence of Mexican cartels 
and their illegal activity in the United States.  Nonetheless, the efficiency of 
the plata o plomo business model has produced a well-oiled machine that 
pumps drugs and aliens into the criminal justice system at a historic rate.   
The macro effects on the criminal justice system can be seen by looking 
at the increased number of prosecutions for narcotics crimes and 
immigration offenses.82  Bureau of Justice statistics reveal that in 1980, 
around the time the Mexican cartels began to rise, the United States 
Government convicted approximately 5,244 persons for drugs offenses.83  
Furthermore, in 1985, it charged 7,239 persons with an immigration 
offense.84  By 2012, those numbers rose to 28,427 convictions for drug 
offenses and 25,682 for immigration offenses.85  One-third of the federal 
drug arrests in 2012 were made in the federal judicial districts located on 
the United States–Mexico border.86  The exponential rise in the number 
of prosecutions for drug and immigration offenses from the early 1980s 
through 2012 mirrors the expansion and evolution of the Mexican 
cartels.87  Similarly, the number of those incarcerated for drug and 
immigration offenses also mirrors the development of the Mexican 
cartels.88  Although other factors certainly play an important part in the 
 
STATISTICAL TABLES 21 (Irene Cooperman & Jill Thomas eds., 2015) (reporting 90.5% of those 
convicted of drug offenses were incarcerated, and 76.1% of those convicted for immigration offenses 
were incarcerated in 2012).  Looking at these statistics, it is easy to see a correlation between the 
presence of cartels and an increase in the percentage of incarcerations.  CHAIKEN & MCDONALD, 
supra at 5; MOTIVANS, supra at 21.  
82.    See JOHN SCALIA & MARIKA F. X. LITRAS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ 191745, 
IMMIGRATION OFFENDERS IN THE FEDERAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, 2000 at 1, 5 (Tina Dorsey & Tom 
Hester eds., 2002) (explaining the amount of U.S. prosecutions of noncitizens for drug trafficking 
between 1985 and 2000 increased from 1,799 to 7,803; and the amount persons suspected of 
immigration offenses increased from 7,239 to 16,495 in the same timeframe). 
83. CHAIKEN & MCDONALD, supra note 81, at 4 (Frank D. Balog ed., 1988). 
84. SCALIA & LITRAS, supra note 82, at 9.  The report only provided data for the number of 
persons charged with an immigration offense, and did not provide conviction data for 1985.  Id. 
85. MOTIVANS, supra note 81, at 17. 
86. Id. at 7. 
87.   See CHAIKEN & MCDONALD, supra note 81, at 4 (providing the number of drug related 
convictions increased by approximately 7,000 from 1980 to 1986); MOTIVANS, supra note 81, at 17 
(showing the number of convictions for drug related offenses in 2012 was 28,427, while immigration 
convictions increased to 25,682); Tabor, supra note 40 (recognizing Cartels have consistently grown in 
Mexico since the 1980s). 
88.   See CHAIKEN & MCDONALD, supra note 81, at 5 (acknowledging the percent of offenders 
sentenced to incarceration for drug offenses increased from 71% in 1980 to 77% in 1986, and the 
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increase of prosecutions and prisoners throughout the years, it is 
particularly significant that the Southwest Border has had the greatest rise 
in number of prosecutions for drug and immigration offenses.89  These 
statistics, which parallel the growth and strengthening of Mexican cartels, 
are a strong indicator that their illegal activity within the United States have 
a large impact on this country’s criminal justice system.  It is anticipated 
that a more in-depth analysis of prosecution and incarceration statistics 
would further strengthen the argument that the system is being affected at 
the macro level.  However, further analysis at the macro level is outside the 
scope of this Comment. 
B.    A Micro Effect – Forced Participation in Crime 
While the effects of Mexican TCOs on the United States criminal justice 
system can be readily observed at the macro level, as discussed in Part I,90 
the Mexican TCOs have also had an effect on a micro level.  One of the 
ways that the Mexican TCOs have had an effect on the system at a micro 
level is by forcing individuals to commit crimes.91  Defendants have 
alleged that cartels have forced them to participate in an array of crimes, 
from drug smuggling to murder.92  Statistically speaking, this does not 
appear to have a large effect on the criminal justice system.  However, the 
problem is growing and there are no easy answers to the legal issue that is 
created when an individual is forced to participate in a crime.93  Can the 
defendant present a duress or necessity defense at trial or in mitigation of 
punishment at sentencing?  Even if they can, will it be successful? 
 
percent of offenders sentenced to incarceration for non-drug offenses increased from 41% in 1980 
to 43% in 1986); MOTIVANS, supra note 81, at 21 (informing 90.5% of the drug offenders and 76.1% 
of the immigration offenders sentenced were incarcerated between October 2011 and September 
2012); Tabor, supra note 40 (discussing the Cartels’ growth in Mexico since the 1980s). 
89.    See MOTIVANS, supra note 81, at 10 (confirming 2012 statistics that “1 in 5 matters referred 
to U.S. attorneys by the DEA were from 5 federal districts along the U.S.-Mexico border”). 
90.    Infra, Part I. 
91. See John Burnett, Migrants Say They’re Unwilling Mules for Cartels, NPR (Dec. 4, 2011, 
6:16 AM), http://www.npr.org/2011/12/04/143025654/migrants-say-theyre-unwilling-mules-for-
cartels [https://perma.cc/K2LH-LDQV] (detailing the cartels’ use of force to coerce migrants into 
committing crimes). 
92. Id.; Kevin Krause, Defendant in Southlake Cartel Lawyer Killing Says He Was ‘Forced’ to Stalk 
Victim, DALLAS NEWS (May 5, 2016) (on file with the St. Mary’s Law Journal). 
93. See Burnett, supra note 91 (noting the government’s skepticism regarding duress claims and 
the differing views of prosecuting and defense attorneys). 
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IV.    DEFINING, ANALYZING, AND UTILIZING THE AFFIRMATIVE 
DEFENSES OF NECESSITY AND DURESS 
As shown in Part II,94 one of the effects that the Mexican cartels have 
on the criminal justice system is the difficult legal issue that arises from 
forcing individuals to participate in crime.  What are the options for 
individuals who, after being threatened with harm to their family, commit 
crimes?  Prosecutors have the authority to withhold prosecution if they 
find the claim of forced participation with no viable alternatives to be 
credible.95  Prosecutors, however, may not be inclined to decline 
prosecution based on an arrested individual’s truthful or self-serving claim 
of forced participation given their inability to verify its veracity.  Absent a 
declination of prosecution, the defendant is left with two options: plead 
guilty and rely on the mercy of the court, or plead not guilty and present a 
duress or necessity defense at trial.96  Section A below defines the 
affirmative defenses of necessity and duress and presents their history in 
federal jurisprudence.97  Section B analyzes the defenses of necessity and 
duress as presented in federal jurisprudence.98  Section C discusses the 
utilization of the duress and necessity defenses at both the trial and 
sentencing phases of a case.99 
A.    Federal Jurisprudence Definition of Duress and Necessity Defenses 
Black’s Law Dictionary defines duress in criminal jurisprudence as “[t]he 
use or threatened use of unlawful force—usu. that a reasonable person 
cannot resist—to compel someone to commit an unlawful act.”100  The 
same dictionary defines necessity in criminal jurisprudence as “[a] 
justification defense for a person who acts in an emergency that he or she 
did not create and who commits a harm that is less severe than the harm 
that would have occurred but for the person’s actions.”101  In most legal 
 
94.     Supra, Part II. 
95.     See CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION 3-4.3(d) (4th ed. 
Am. Bar Ass’n) (“A prosecutor’s office should not file or maintain charges if it believes the defendant 
is innocent, no matter what the state of the evidence.”). 
96. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(a)(1) (“A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, or (with the 
court’s consent) nolo contendere.”). 
97.      Infra, Part IV.A. 
98.      Infra, Part IV.B. 
99.      Infra, Part IV.C. 
100. Duress, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009). 
101. Necessity, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009). 
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applications, duress has been classified as an excuse and necessity has been 
classified as a justification.102  Traditionally, the defense of duress is 
applicable when a defendant is forced to participate in a crime by threat of 
force from a human source.103  On the other hand, a necessity defense is 
available when a defendant is coerced into a criminal act by a force of 
nature.104  The distinctions between the defenses of necessity and 
duress—along with arguments of whether they are excuses or 
justifications—have been, and continue to be, the source of great 
debate.105  Fortunately, a resolution of that debate is outside the scope of 
this Comment.  It is sufficient to recognize that the distinction exists.106 
The federal court system in the United States was established in 
1789.107  Shortly thereafter, the United States Supreme Court recognized 
that duress was a permissible defense to a violation of law.108  Since then, 
the duress defense has been utilized with differing results in cases charging 
offenses such as: possession with intent to distribute drugs,109 felon in 
 
102. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 cmt. 1 (AM. LAW INST. 1985) (commenting that the 
defense of necessity is generally held to be a justification for criminal conduct); WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 
CRIMINAL LAW 491–92, 523 (4th ed. 2003) (footnote omitted) (finding an individual who commits a 
crime under duress may be excused for committing the crime, and “[n]ecessity . . . is a defense 
belonging in the justification category of defenses rather than the excuse category”); Monu Bedi, 
Excusing Behavior: Reclassifying The Federal Common Law Defenses of Duress and Necessity Relying on the 
Victim’s Role, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 575, 575 (2011) (“Most scholars categorize duress as 
an excuse . . . and necessity as a justification . . . .”); Laurie Kratky Doré, Downward Adjustment and the 
Slippery Slope: The Use of Duress in Defense of Battered Offenders, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 665, 745 (1995) (asserting 
most jurisdictions classify duress as an excuse and necessity as a justification).  But see Peter Westen & 
James Mangiafico, The Criminal Defense of Duress: A Justification, Not an Excuse—And Why It Matters, 
6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 833, 863 (2003) (arguing for the classification of duress defenses as 
justifications).   
103. See LAFAVE, supra note 102, at 491–92, 523 (4th ed. 2003) (describing duress as acting 
“under the pressure of an unlawful threat from another human being”). 
104. Id. at 523. 
105.   See Bedi, supra note 102, at 578 (“Scholars have extensively examined whether necessity 
and duress are properly understood as excused or justified acts.”); Doré, supra note 102, at 744–745 
(1995) (analyzing whether duress is a justification or an excuse); LAFAVE, supra note 102, at 491–92, 
523 (4th ed. 2003) (detailing arguments between authors on the classification of the defenses as an 
excuse or justification).  
106. See LAFAVE, supra note 102, at 448 (“At early common law, the distinction between 
justification and excuse was a critical one . . . .”). 
107. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (1789) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1652 
(2012)). 
108. See United States v. Vigol, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 346, 347 (C.C.D. Pa. 1795) (No. 16,621) 
(finding the law recognizes fear as an excuse for committing a crime). 
109. See United States v. Villegas, 899 F.2d 1324, 1344 (2d Cir. 1990) (determining generalized 
fear is not sufficient to show fear of serious bodily harm or death). 
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possession of a firearm,110 escape,111 kidnapping,112 and mutiny.113  The 
Court’s decision in United States v. Vigol114 is the earliest known criminal 
case in the United States that references the defense of duress.115  In its 
decision, the Court stated, “[F]ear[,] which the law recognizes as an excuse 
for the perpetration of an offence[,] must proceed from an immediate and 
actual danger, threatening the very life of the party.”116  In affirming the 
defendant’s guilt, the Court determined that fear of property loss or 
apprehension of personal injury was not sufficient to avail oneself of a 
duress defense.117   
Not long after recognizing a defense of duress, the Court, in a series of 
admiralty law decisions,118 recognized a defense of necessity.119  The 
facts presented in each of those cases involved a ship that violated trade 
laws by entering prohibited ports in the West Indies.120  In each case, the 
defendants acknowledged breaking the law, but argued a necessity to enter 
the off-limit ports to save their crew and cargo because of foul weather 
and faulty or damaged ships.121  The Court held, in all three cases, that a 
 
110. See United States v. Alston, 526 F.3d 91, 98 (3d Cir. 2008) (affirming a defendant’s 
conviction after determining that there was no evidence of an immediate threat of death or bodily 
injury). 
111. See United States v. Michelson, 559 F.2d 567, 571 (9th Cir. 1977) (concluding the 
defendant was not entitled to a duress instruction because all elements of the defense were not met). 
112. See United States v. Pestana, 865 F. Supp. 2d 357, 367 (S.D.N.Y 2011), aff’d sub nom, 
United States v. Oriz, Nos. 11-4860(L), 11-4931(CON), 2013 WL 2150722 (2d Cir. 2013) (noting the 
unavailability of a duress defense because there was no immediate threat of force). 
113. See United States v. Haskell, 26 F. Cas. 207, 210 (C.C. Pa. 1823) (giving a jury instruction 
which required a well-grounded fear of death for the availability of an excuse defense). 
114. United States v. Vigol, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 346 (C.C.D. Pa. 1795) (No. 16,621). 
115. Bedi, supra note 102, at 585 n.58. 
116. Vigol, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 347. 
117. Id. 
118. See The New York, 16 U.S. 59 (1818) (recognizing a necessity defense when there was a 
need to bring a ship into port because of a loss of the rudder); Brig Struggle v. United States, 13 U.S. 
(9 Cranch) 71 (1815) (addressing a claim of necessity when the ship’s crew prematurely sold cargo at 
another port to preserve the integrity and safety of their ship); Brig James Wells v. United States, 
11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 22 (1812) (considering the defense of necessity as it applied to adverse weather 
conditions affecting the safety of the ship’s route). 
119. See Bedi, supra note 102, at 580 (footnote omitted) (“The first reference to necessity as a 
defense to a violation of law appears to come from admiralty cases.”). 
120. The New York, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) at 68; Brig Struggle, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) at 76; Brig 
James Wells, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 22; see also Bedi, supra note 102, at 580 n.13 (discussing the admiralty 
cases).  
121. The New York, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) at 68; Brig Struggle, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) at 72–73; Brig 
James Wells, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 22–23.  
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claim of necessity would be viable with sufficient evidence to support the 
claims; however, the Court in each case also found that the defendants did 
not produce sufficient evidence to support the assertion of the defense.122  
The United States Supreme Court, in United States v. Kirby,123 inferred a 
necessity defense when deciding whether a county sheriff had violated a 
federal statute that prohibited the delay of mail delivery by arresting a 
postman for murder.124  In its decision, the Court provided an example of 
a prisoner escaping a burning jail as a justification for committing the 
crime of escape.125  The Court cited “common sense” in concluding that 
the sheriff was justified in violating the statute.126  In its opinion, the 
Court never used the term necessity; the Court examined the issue by 
framing the sheriff’s choice as allowing the mail to be delivered or 
arresting a murderer, thereby implying the sheriff’s necessity to break the 
law.127   
As discussed above, the United States Supreme Court recognized both 
necessity and duress defenses early in the nation’s history; however, it 
would be over one hundred years before the United States Supreme Court 
discussed the defenses at length.128 
In 1980, the Supreme Court decided United States v. Bailey,129 which, like 
the example the Court referenced in United States v. Kirby, dealt with the 
issue of whether an inmate who had escaped from a prison could present a 
duress or necessity defense.130  In its decision, the Court stated, “[W]e 
must decide . . . the elements that constitute defenses such as duress and 
 
122. The New York, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) at 68; Brig Struggle, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) at 76; Brig 
James Wells, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 25–26. 
123. United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 482 (1868). 
124. See id. at 486–87 (implying the necessity defense by analogy to a hypothetical prisoner 
escaping a burning prison).  
125. Id. at 487. 
126. Id.  
127. See id. at 486–87 (holding the sheriff’s arrest of the mail carrier was necessary and a better 
choice than allowing the murderer to go free so that the mail recipients would not be 
inconvenienced). 
128.    After the Supreme Court decided Kirby, the defenses of necessity and duress were not 
discussed at length until the Supreme Court heard United States v. Bailey.  United States v. Bailey, 
444 U.S. 394 (1980).  See Bedi, supra note 102, at 585 (noting Bailey “provides the first detailed 
discussion of duress in the criminal context”). 
129. United States v Bailey, 444 U.S. 394 (1980). 
130. See id. at 415 (“An escapee who flees from a jail . . . may well be entitled to an instruction 
on duress or necessity . . . .”); Kirby, 74 U.S. (7 Wall) at 487 (“[T]hat a prisoner who breaks prison 
shall be guilty of felony, does not extend to a prisoner who breaks out when the prison is on 
fire . . . .”). 
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necessity.”131 The Court, nonetheless, did not list the specific elements of 
either defense, but instead discussed the defenses as shaped by common 
law.132  The Court wrote that, at common law, a defense of duress 
excused criminal conduct when an individual was under “threat of 
imminent death or serious bodily injury, which threat caused the actor to 
engage in conduct violating the literal terms of the criminal law.”133  The 
Court further noted that at common law a duress defense could only be 
used when an individual was forced to participate in a crime by other 
human beings.134  It provided an example of the proper use of a duress 
defense through the hypothetical situation of individual B threatening to 
kill individual A if A did not destroy a dike.135  The Court then 
distinguished the necessity from duress, and described necessity as a 
choice of evils that was applicable “where physical forces beyond the 
actor’s control rendered illegal conduct the lesser of two evils.”136  It 
described the proper use of a necessity defense through a hypothetical 
situation where A could argue a necessity if A destroyed a dike to keep 
valuable property from flooding.137  After defining both the necessity and 
duress defenses, the Court indicated that neither defense could be used if a 
defendant had a reasonable, legal alternative to committing a crime.138  
The Court applied these definitions and their exception to its conclusion 
that the defendants could not avail themselves of the defenses because of 
insufficient evidence to support either claims.139 
Twenty-one years later, in United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ 
Cooperative,140 the United States Supreme Court cited United States v. Bailey 
when acknowledging the existence of a necessity defense, stating it had 
never completely rejected the defense.141  The Court defined the necessity 
 
131. Bailey, 444 U.S. at 397. 
132. See id. at 409–10 (“Common law historically distinguished between the defenses of duress 
and necessity.”). 
133. Id. at 409. 
134. See id. at 409–10 (1980) (reviewing the common elements of duress). 
135. Id. at 410. 
136. Id. 
137. Id. 
138. See id. (“[I]f there [is] a reasonable, legal alternative . . . the defenses will fail.”). 
139. See id. at 417 (holding the respondents failed to provide sufficient evidence because a 
critical element was missing). 
140. United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Coop., 532 U.S. 483 (2001). 
141. See id. at 490 (“[T]his Court has discussed the possibility of a necessity defense without 
altogether rejecting it.”). 
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defense as the “situation where physical forces beyond the actor’s control 
rendered illegal conduct the lesser of two evils.”142 
In Dixon v. United States,143 the Court took one step closer to adopting 
specific elements of a duress defense.144  In a footnote discussion, the 
Court noted that the elements of a duress defense are not defined in any 
federal statute.145  In the same footnote, the Court then listed specific 
elements for a duress defense, qualifying such with: “[W]e presume the 
accuracy of the District Court’s description of these elements.”146  The 
Court then, citing a Fifth Circuit case,147 provided the following 
requirements: 
(1) The defendant was under an unlawful and imminent threat of such a 
nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily 
injury; (2) the defendant had not recklessly or negligently placed herself in a 
situation in which it was probable that she would be forced to perform the 
criminal conduct; (3) the defendant had no reasonable, legal alternative to 
violating the law, that is, a chance both to refuse to perform the criminal act 
and also to avoid the threatened harm; and (4) that a direct causal 
relationship may be reasonably anticipated between the criminal act and the 
avoidance of the threatened harm.148 
Although the case was ultimately decided on other grounds, and the 
defense was not central to the holding, the Court appeared to embrace the 
Fifth Circuit’s definition of duress.149   
Until recent times, discussing the traditional definitions of duress and 
necessity would sufficiently chronicle the legal community’s approach to 
justification defenses.  The two defenses were not mixed or crossed and, 
as detailed, have been categorized as two separate and distinct defenses.  
Notwithstanding their separateness, both the United States Supreme Court 
 
142. Id. at 490 (quoting Bailey, 444 U.S. at 410). 
143. Dixon v. United States, 548 U.S. 1 (2006). 
144. See id. at 4 n.2 (acknowledging the district court’s description of the elements of defense). 
145. Id. 
146. Id. 
147. Dixon, 548 U.S. at 4 n.2 (citing United States v. Harper, 802 F.2d 115, 117 (5th Cir. 
1986)); accord United States v. Montes, 602 F.3d 381, 389 (5th Cir. 2010) (reciting the four elements 
of a duress defense); see also United States v. Willis, 38 F.3d 170, 175 (5th Cir. 1994) (summarizing the 
four common elements of duress); United States v. Gant, 691 F.2d 1159, 1162–63 (5th Cir. 1982) 
(purporting the same). 
148. Dixon, 548 U.S. at 4 n.2. 
149. See id. at 4 n.2, 17 (2006) (relying on the District Court’s description of the elements). 
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and federal appeals courts have stated that, “Modern cases have tended to 
blur the distinction between duress and necessity.”150  When discussing 
the hybrid that emerges from merging the defenses of duress and 
necessity, courts have labeled such as a “justification” defense, providing a 
definition that mirrors the four elements the Supreme Court referenced in 
Dixon v. United States.151  Combining the two defenses into one 
justification defense may signal willingness from courts to eschew the 
traditional separation of defenses along the lines of forces of nature 
(necessity) versus human forces (duress).152 
The history of the Court’s definition of the duress and necessity 
defenses will form the foundation for analyzing how courts have applied 
both defenses.  
B.    Analyzing the Defenses of Duress and Necessity 
1.    Duress 
As discussed above, federal courts have embraced the definition of 
duress as having four elements.  The first element reads: “The defendant 
was under an unlawful and imminent threat of such a nature as to induce a 
well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily injury . . . .”153  In 
analyzing the first element, it is necessary to break the element into three 
parts: (1) the defendant was under imminent threat, (2) the threat was of a 
nature of death or serious bodily injury, and (3) the threat induced a well-
grounded fear.   
In order to meet the first element of the duress defense, courts have 
consistently emphasized that a defendant must provide evidence that they 
were operating under a present threat.154  Courts have required that the 
 
150. United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 410 (1980); United States v. Contento-Pachon, 
723 F.2d 691, 695 (9th Cir. 1984); see United States v. Butler, 485 F.3d 569, 572 n.1 (10th Cir. 2007) 
(stating the defenses of duress and necessity have been blurred “to the point of merger” (quoting 
United States v. Holliday, 457 F.3d 121, 127 (1st Cir. 2006)). 
151. See United States v. Leahy, 473 F.3d 401, 409 (1st Cir. 2007) (citing Dixon, 548 U.S. at 
4 n.2). 
152. See, e.g., Butler, 485 F.3d at 572 n.1 (“Courts have used the terms duress, necessity, and 
justification interchangeably.” (citing Leahy, 473 F.3d at 406)). 
153. Dixon, 548 U.S. at 4 n.2. 
154. See United States v. Tanner, 941 F.2d 574, 587 (7th Cir. 1991) (concluding the evidence 
must show the threat of harm as one that is “present, immediate, or impending”).  But see 
United States v. Barash, 365 F.2d 395, 401–02 (2d Cir. 1966) (finding a threat of economic harm by a 
government official, although not as complete of a defense as duress, may be considered when 
analyzing the specific intent needed for a bribery conviction). 
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threat be immediate, and have rejected fear of future harm as being 
sufficient to meet the standard.155  In United States v. Salgado-Ocampo,156 
the court analyzed the word imminent.157  The defendant in that case 
received a single phone call that threatened harm at a later time.158  The 
court, in finding the defendant did not meet the requirement of acting 
under imminent fear or bodily harm, found that the words imminent and 
later were opposites.159  In United States v. Haynes,160 the Seventh Circuit 
similarly declined to find imminent harm, even though harm might occur 
within several hours.161  The Seventh Circuit’s refusal to find imminent 
harm, when the facts showed the harm was likely to occur within several 
hours, is representative of courts’ view that the harm must be akin to 
simultaneous.162  In fact, courts have stated that finding the type of 
imminent danger that would justify a duress defense would be a rarity.163  
Although courts have stressed that all elements of the duress defense must 
be present to utilize the defense, the immediacy element is often a court’s 
focus when determining if the defense is allowed.164  Courts’ strict 
interpretation of imminent danger casts doubt on the receptiveness of an 
argument that presents duress due to threat of future harm as a defense to 
a crime.  
 
155. See Iva Ikuko Toguri D’Aquino v. United States, 192 F.2d 338, 359 (9th Cir. 1951) (“We 
know of no rule that would permit one . . . to claim immunity from prosecution . . . by setting up a 
claim of mental fear of possible future action . . . .”).  
156. United States v. Salgado-Ocampo, 159 F.3d 322 (7th Cir. 1998). 
157. See id. at 326–27 (interpreting imminent to mean the opposite of later). 
158. Id. at 326. 
159. Id. at 326–27 (citing United States v. Haynes, 143 F.3d 1089, 1090 (7th Cir. 1998)). 
160. United States v. Haynes, 143 F.3d 1089 (7th Cir. 1998). 
161. See id. at 1090 (holding threat of action, which was set to occur later that afternoon, was 
insufficient to raise the justification defense). 
162. See United States v. Panter, 688 F.2d 268, 269, 271–72 (5th Cir. 1982) (finding an 
implication that harm was imminent when the defendant had been stabbed in the stomach); see also 
United States v. Paolello, 951 F.2d 537, 542 (3d Cir. 1991) (concluding the defendant was in 
imminent harm when a gun was produced during an altercation). 
163. See United States v. Perrin, 45 F.3d 869, 874 (4th Cir. 1995) (“It has been only on the 
rarest of occasions that our sister circuits have found . . . the type of imminent danger that would 
warrant the application of a justification defense.”). 
164. See United States v. Patrick, 542 F.2d 381, 388 (7th Cir. 1976) (classifying all elements of 
a duress defense as necessary, but emphasizing “the element of immediacy” as one of “crucial 
importance”). 
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To allow a duress defense, courts have not only required the harm to be 
immediate, but that it also involve death or serious bodily injury.165  
Courts have declined to allow a duress defense based on a threat of 
incarceration,166 property damage,167 or economic coercion.168  What is 
not clear is whether courts will deny the defense if the threat of death or 
serious bodily injury is directed towards a third party.169  In Iva Ikuko 
Toguri D’Aquino v. United States,170 the Ninth Circuit decided a case in 
which the appellant was convicted of treason, and appealed the verdict 
based on, among other issues, an argument that the district court 
committed errors when addressing her duress defense.171  The appellant 
had been convicted of treason for working as a radio broadcaster for the 
Japanese Government during World War II.172  She argued that the trial 
court erred when providing jury instructions that indicated that a duress 
defense required the fear of imminent death or serious bodily harm be 
directed toward her, personally.173  The appellant presented evidence 
during trial, indicating that she knew the Japanese government had 
tortured and killed individuals that did not participate in radio broadcasts 
and, because of this knowledge, she was afraid for her safety and was, thus, 
 
165. See Dixon v. United States, 548 U.S. 1, 4 n.2 (2006) (requiring the harm to be “of such a 
nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily injury”). 
166. See United States v. Alexander, 287 F.3d 811, 818 (9th Cir. 2002) (receiving threats of 
incarceration “is not sufficient coercion to excuse the commission of a crime” (citing United States v. 
Lemon, 824 F.2d 763, 765 (9th Cir. 1987)); see also United States v. Martin, 740 F.2d 1352, 1361 
(6th Cir. 1984) (holding a jury instruction, which provided that threat of incarceration is insufficient 
for a duress defense, was proper (citing United States v. Campbell, 675 F.2d 815, 820–21 (6th Cir. 
1982)). 
167. See United States v. Agard, 605 F.2d 665, 666–68 (2d Cir. 1979) (declining to allow a 
duress defense for a store owner who believed he was going to be robbed). 
168. See United States v. Colacurcio, 659 F.2d 684, 690 (5th Cir. 1981) (finding coercion by 
law enforcement officers insufficient to create a duress defense based on “economic coercion”). 
169. See, e.g., United States v. Contento-Pachon, 723 F.2d 691, 694 (9th Cir. 1984) 
(acknowledging the possibility of immediacy when believable threats were directed to related third 
persons); contra Iva Ikuko Toguri D’Aquino v. United States, 192 F.2d 338, 360–61 (9th Cir. 1951) 
(concluding there was insufficient evidence of immediacy when threats were made against known 
third persons). 
170. Iva Ikuko Toguri D’Aquino v. United States, 192 F.2d 338 (9th Cir. 1951). 
171. See id. at 357 (detailing the defendant’s argument, which contended that the trial court 
provided inappropriate jury instructions for her duress defense). 
172. Id. at 347–48. 
173. See id. at 360 (recounting the defendant’s assertion that the trial court erred by concluding 
knowledge of harm to other prisoners of war did not create a mental state sufficient to support a 
duress defense). 
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coerced into working at the radio station.174  The Ninth Circuit noted the 
trial court granted the appellant latitude by allowing evidence of atrocities 
and threats of atrocities against third persons, under the theory that this 
information had a bearing upon the appellant’s state of mind.175  
However, the court ultimately denied the appeal and affirmed the 
conviction by upholding the trial court’s jury instruction.176  It should be 
noted that the appellant made a compelling argument that the element of 
duress requiring apprehension of impending death or serious bodily harm 
should be inapplicable in cases where a defendant was in an enemy 
country and was compelled to act by an enemy government.177  Because 
she was unable to get protection from the United States, the appellant 
argued that it was erroneous for the duress defense to require an imminent 
threat of death or bodily harm.178  The appellant provided authority for 
the proposition that if an individual joined a rebellion because he was 
forced to, and could provide proof of such force, then a presumption 
exists that the individual continued in the rebellion against his will even if 
there was no constant force keeping him from leaving.179  The Ninth 
Circuit considered whether this argument would be viable for an individual 
claiming forced service into enemy military service, before determining it 
was inapplicable to the facts of the case before it.180 
The Ninth Circuit has allowed a duress defense to be presented when a 
defendant alleged a third party was the recipient of a threat of imminent 
harm.181  In United States v. Contento-Pachon,182 the court remanded the 
 
174. See id. (providing accounts of other prisoners of war who were punished for disobeying 
orders). 
175. See id. at 361 (acknowledging the trial judge’s theory of relevance for threats against third 
persons “as bearing upon the state of mind of the appellant”). 
176. See id. (“We think that the record [as a] whole discloses that the jury was not 
misled . . . .”). 
177. See id. at 358–59 (addressing the defendant’s contention that known threats of death or 
torture made by enemy governments against its prisoners of war satisfies the immediacy 
requirement). 
178. Id. 
179. See id. at 359 (citing EDWARD HYDE EAST, TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 
70–71 (P. Byrne eds., 1806)) (“It may perhaps be impossible to account for every day, week, or 
month; and therefore it may be sufficient to excuse him if he can prove an original force upon him[.]”). 
180. Id. 
181. See United States v. Contento-Pachon, 723 F.2d 691, 693–94 (9th Cir. 1984) (setting 
forth a duress defense, which alleged threats against third persons, namely, the defendant’s wife and 
child). 
182. United States v. Contento-Pachon, 723 F.2d 691 (9th Cir. 1984). 
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case back to the district court to allow evidence of a duress defense to be 
presented to a jury.183  In that case, Contento-Pachon lived in Bogota, 
Colombia, where he was employed as a taxi driver.184  On one occasion, 
Contento-Pachon was offered a job as a “drug mule” to carry cocaine to 
the United States.185  Contento-Pachon turned down the offer to 
transport the drugs, which resulted in a death threat against his wife and 
child if he did not cooperate.186  Contento-Pachon eventually complied, 
due to the threat, and agreed to carry the drugs.187  Prior to departing the 
country with the drugs, Contento-Pachon was informed he was being 
watched, and that if he did not follow all instructions, he, along with his 
family, would be killed.188  Nonetheless, the trial court found Contento-
Pachon’s evidence was “insufficient to support a duress defense.”189  The 
appeals court noted that the trial court denied the duress defense because 
it had found the threats of harm to Contento-Pachon were not 
immediate.190  The Ninth Circuit, however, found Contento-Pachon’s 
testimony credible and held the threats of harm to him and his family were 
not threats of future harm, but were in fact immediate.191  In support of 
its finding, the court cited evidence that the individual that had threatened 
Contento-Pachon was deeply involved in the distribution of narcotics, 
their drugs were worth a lot of money, and information regarding 
Contento-Pachon’s family and residence had been specifically mentioned 
in the threats against him.192  In its opinion, the Ninth Circuit specifically 
discussed the threat to a third party (the defendant’s family) in the 
determination that the defendant was entitled to present evidence of a 
duress defense.193  Although the court considered the threats to the 
defendant along with the threats to a third party, the court did not hesitate 
 
183. Id. at 695–96. 
184. Id. at 693. 
185. Id.  




190. See id. at 694 (“The district court found that the initial threats were not immediate 
because ‘they were conditioned on defendant’s failure to cooperate in the future and did not place 
defendant and his family in immediate danger.’”).  
191. Id. 
192. Id. 
193. Id.  
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in finding that threats to a third party should be considered as proof of 
coercion.194 
Lastly, courts have required that imminent threats must induce a well-
grounded fear.195  Courts have rejected evidence of a generalized fear and 
have required that the threat be specific and, as previously discussed, 
immediate.196  In using an objective standard, requiring that the fear be 
well-grounded, courts do not allow a defendant to make an arbitrary claim 
that he was afraid.197  In United States v. Nwoye,198 the court asserted, 
“Reasonableness is the touchstone of a duress defense.”199  In its 
decision, the court held that the fear of imminent death or serious bodily 
harm must be reasonable.200 
The second element of the duress defense requires “the 
defendant . . . not recklessly or negligently place . . . herself in a situation in 
which it was probable that she would be forced to perform the criminal 
conduct[.]”201  The Second Circuit discussed this element at length in its 
United States v. Agard202 decision.203  In the Agard case, the facts indicate 
that the appellant was working in his shop when he initiated an altercation 
between himself and three other individuals.204  When the altercation 
escalated, the appellant grabbed an assault rifle and fired at the 
individuals.205  On a subsequent occasion, the appellant attempted to 
assist the police in apprehending an armed individual that had shot a police 
 
194. See id. (addressing the multiple threat factors against the defendant that supported a 
duress defense). 
195. See id. at 693 (noting one of the three elements of duress is “a well-grounded fear that the 
threat will be carried out”). 
196. See United States v. Housand, 550 F.2d 818, 825 (2d Cir. 1977) (“[T]he fear must be 
more than a general apprehension of danger, particularly if one has the chance to escape or to seek 
the protection of government.”). 
197. See, e.g., Dixon v. United States, 548 U.S. 1, 4 n.2 (requiring the fear to “induce a well-
grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily injury”).  But see United States v. Nwoye, 824 F.3d 
1129, 1137 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (“[A]ny assessment of the reasonableness of a defendant’s actions must 
take into account the defendant’s ‘particular circumstances,’ at least to a certain extent.”). 
198. United States v. Nwoye, 824 F.3d 1129 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
199. Id. at 1136. 
200. Id. 
201. Dixon, 548 U.S. at 4 n.2. 
202. United States v. Agard, 605 F.2d 665 (2d Cir. 1979). 
203. See id. at 667–68 (holding there can be no defense where a defendant negligently or 
recklessly subjects themselves to duress). 
204. Id. at 666. 
205. Id. 
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officer.206  The appellant armed himself with a shotgun and approached 
the police to offer his assistance.207  The police arrested the appellant 
when they discovered that he was armed.208  The appellant was 
subsequently charged and convicted of unlawful possession of a 
firearm.209  Thereafter, the appellant appealed the conviction because the 
trial court refused to instruct the jury on a duress defense.210  The court 
determined, in its analysis, that the defendant had deliberately placed 
himself in a situation where he felt the need to arm himself.211  In making 
such determination, the court relied on the evidence presented at trial, 
which showed that the appellant leapt over the counter of his pizza shop 
and tried to physically remove the individuals he believed may have been 
threatening him.212  The evidence showed that only after the appellant 
initiated the fight, which eventually escalated, did he feel the need to arm 
himself with a firearm.213  The court noted that the shop owner took 
action despite any evidence that the men were armed or any request by the 
appellant for the men to leave.214  It determined that the appellant actively 
placed himself in the high-risk situation and, therefore, could not receive a 
jury instruction on duress for possessing a weapon.215  The court also 
concluded that the appellant similarly placed himself in an unsafe situation 
when he armed himself with a shotgun and tried to assist the police in 
apprehending a dangerous individual.216  Because the appellant recklessly 
or negligently placed himself in a position of danger, he was not entitled to 
a jury instruction on a defense of duress.217  Although the second element 
 
206. Id. at 666–67. 
207. Id. at 667. 
208. Id.  
209. Id.  
210. Id.  
211. See id. at 668 (noting the “appellant admitted that he initiated the altercation, which 
resulted in his seeking a weapon”). 
212. See id. (“By attempting to physically eject the men from his shop . . . appellant cause[d] 
himself to be placed in a situation in which he could well have expected possible harm.”).  
213. Id.  
214. See id. (“Although [the defendant] testified that there was ‘talk of gunplay’ and vague 
threatening motions by one of the men involved, he did not see any weapons nor did he demand that 
they leave his shop.”).  
215. Id.  
216. Id.  
217. See id. (“Therefore, having placed himself in such a potentially dangerous situation, 
appellant can hardly be heard to claim that the danger he encountered justified his unlawful conduct.  
He was not entitled to a jury instruction regarding the defense of duress and coercion.”). 
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must be analyzed when affirmatively pleading a duress defense, the 
hypothetical situation discussed in the introduction of this Comment 
would likely not qualify as a situation in which an individual has recklessly 
or negligently placed himself in a position in which he must perform a 
crime. 
The third element of the duress defense requires that a “defendant had 
no reasonable, legal alternative to violating the law, that is, a chance both 
to refuse to perform the criminal act and also to avoid the threatened 
harm.”218  In Shannon v. United States,219 the Tenth Circuit heard an appeal 
from defendants that were convicted of conspiracy to commit 
kidnapping.220  The appellants were appealing the trial court’s refusal to 
give jury instructions which would have allowed the jury to acquit the 
appellants if they were found to have been acting under coercion.221  In 
its decision, the appeals court recognized that coercion could excuse the 
commission of a crime; however, it noted that the availability of an 
opportunity to avoid the criminal act, would render the defense 
unavailable.222  The facts indicate that the appellants first became 
involved in the conspiracy when a kidnapped individual was brought to 
their ranch.223  The appellants allowed the kidnapped individual to remain 
at their ranch under guard for a couple of days.224  The kidnapped 
individual was then moved to another location where he remained under 
guard for several more days.225  Throughout the ordeal, the appellants 
assisted in guarding the kidnapped individual, and also provided ice and 
meals to the other individuals that were involved in the crime.226  The 
evidence showed that the appellants participated in the crime voluntarily 
and were not threatened in any manner until the day the kidnapped 
individual was released.227  In its decision, the court analyzed the facts and 
determined that the appellants had ample opportunity to end their 
 
218. Dixon v. United States, 548 U.S. 1, 4 n.2 (2006). 
219. Shannon v. United States, 76 F.2d 490 (10th Cir. 1935). 
220. Id. at 491. 
221. Id. at 492. 
222. See id. at 493 (“One who has full opportunity to avoid the act without danger of that kind 
cannot invoke the doctrine of coercion . . . .”). 
223. Id. at 492. 
224. Id.  
225. Id. at 492–93. 
226. Id. at 493. 
227. Id.  
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participation in the crime and report such to the police.228  The court 
seemed to focus on the large amounts of time the appellants were not in 
the presence of the individuals that eventually threatened them when it 
stated, “One who has full opportunity to avoid the act without danger of 
that kind cannot invoke the doctrine of coercion and is not entitled to an 
instruction submitting that question to the jury.”229   
The Sixth Circuit has stated that “the keystone of the analysis” of a 
duress claim is whether or not there is an alternative to violating the 
law.230  In United States v. Singleton,231 the court found that if there is an 
alternative to committing a crime that arises before or during the event, 
failure to take the alternative will result in a denial of a duress defense.232  
The Fifth Circuit’s standard is slightly more onerous, requiring the 
defendant actually try the alternative in order to argue that he had no 
alternative.233 
The Tenth, Sixth, and Fifth Circuits’ analysis of the third duress element 
leaves little room for support of a duress defense for the hypothetical 
presented in the introduction of this Comment.  However, the First 
Circuit’s decision in R.I. Recreation Center, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety 
Co.234 seems to detail a more forgiving analysis of when a defendant will 
or will not have a reasonable legal alternative to committing a crime.235  
The court acknowledged that coercion will excuse crimes if each element 
of the defense is met.236  The facts of the case indicate that the plaintiff 
received a phone call from his brother’s wife requesting that he meet his 
brother at a location in Pawtucket, Rhode Island.237  When the plaintiff 
arrived at the meeting he was forced into a vehicle, told that he would be 
 
228. Id.  
229. Id.  
230. United States v. Singleton, 902 F.2d 471, 473 (6th Cir. 1990) (citing United States v. 
Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 410 (1980)). 
231. United States v. Singleton, 902 F.2d 471 (6th Cir. 1990). 
232. Id. at 473. 
233. See United States v. Estrada-Monzon, No. 16-40542, 2017 WL 2813855, at *3 (5th Cir. 
June 28, 2017) (“Because duress is an affirmative defense, a defendant must present evidence of each 
of the elements before it may be presented to a jury.” (quoting United States v. Posada-Rios, 
158 F.3d 832, 873 (5th Cir. 1998))). 
234. R.I. Recreation Ctr., Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 177 F.2d 603 (1st Cir. 1949). 
235. See id. at 606 (finding no basis for the assumption that a police force would be unable to 
protect any person that may be threatened if an individual, committing a crime under coercion, alerts 
the authorities). 
236. Id. at 605. 
237. Id. at 604. 
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driven to his place of business, and ordered to remove cash from the safe 
and take it to armed individuals.238  The armed individuals informed the 
plaintiff that if he did not comply with their orders, his brother and his 
brother’s wife would be harmed.239  The plaintiff complied with the 
orders, gave the money to the armed individuals, and then alerted the 
police as to what had occurred.240  The plaintiff argued he had been acting 
under coercion and, as such, he was innocent of any dishonesty, fraud, or 
criminal act.241  The appeals court affirmed the trial court’s judgment 
against the plaintiff.242  In its decision, the appeals court focused on the 
fact that the plaintiff was allowed to leave the presence of the armed 
individuals, enter the building, remove the money, and walk over a mile to 
deliver the money.243  Like the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Shannon v. 
United States, the First Circuit determined that the plaintiff had plenty of 
time to avoid the crime and alert the authorities.244  The court dismissed 
the plaintiff’s argument that he was unable to alert the authorities because 
he pre-supposed that the police would be unable to protect him and his 
family.245  The court based the dismissal on its belief that the police forces 
in Pawtucket and Providence, Rhode Island were adequately equipped and 
staffed to take on the armed individuals and protect the plaintiff and his 
family.246  The court’s analysis, thus, opens an argument that a case could 
be distinguished if the facts indicate that threats are made from individuals 
that the local police or authorities are unable to provide protection from. 
The fourth and final element of the duress defense requires that there 
be “a direct causal relationship . . . reasonably anticipated between the 
criminal act and the avoidance of the threatened harm.”247  In United States 
v. Alston,248 the Third Circuit discussed the fourth element of the duress 
defense.249  The facts indicate that the appellant was arrested for 
 
238. Id.  
239. Id.  
240. Id. at 604–05. 
241. Id. at 605. 
242. Id. at 606. 
243. Id. at 605–06. 
244. Id. at 606. 
245. Id.  
246. Id.  
247. Dixon v. United States, 548 U.S. 1, 4 n.2 (2006). 
248. United States v. Alston, 526 F.3d 91 (3d Cir. 2008). 
249. See generally id. at 96 (3d Cir. 2008) (discussing the causal relationship as it applies to a 
felon in possession of a firearm). 
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“possession of a firearm by a convicted felon” after Philadelphia Police 
responded to reports of gunshots in the city.250  The appellant admitted to 
possessing the firearm but stated that he needed the gun for self-defense 
because he had seen a man that had shot him one-year prior.251  The 
appellant, who was wearing a bulletproof vest when arrested, asserted that 
the man who had previously shot him had told him “he was going to 
‘get’” him.252  The appellant further indicated that after being told this, he 
retrieved a gun from his mother’s house for protection.253  The appellant 
was arrested the same day he started carrying the weapon.254  The trial 
court denied the appellant the use of the justification defense, and the 
appellant filed a timely appeal.255  The appeals court determined there was 
“no direct causal relationship between the criminal action (possession of a 
firearm) and avoidance of the threatened harm (retaliation by Bentley).”256  
In its analysis, the court concluded that even though the appellant had 
seen the man who had shot him and had heard him say that, “he was going 
to ‘get’” him, the appellant’s actions were not sufficiently connected to the 
crime.257  When making this determination, the court focused on the 
imminence of the harm to gauge the appellant’s need for the weapon.258  
Because the court ascertained that the harm was not imminent, the court 
found the connection of the crime to the avoidance of the harm to be 
attenuated, and, therefore, the appellant was precluded from using a duress 
defense.259  The court then proceeded to analyze imminence in depth by 
citing cases previously discussed above in the analysis of the first element 
of the duress defense.260   
The Alston court’s focus on the imminence of the harm—to determine 
the presence of a causal connection—brings the analysis of the elements 
of the duress defense full circle. 
 
250. Id. at 93. 
251. Id.  
252. Id.  
253. Id.  
254. See id. (“As noted, Alston was arrested around 10 p.m. that same night.”). 
255. Id. at 93–94. 
256. Id. at 95–96. 
257. See id. (“The causal relationship in these circumstances is attenuated at best.”). 
258. Id.  
259. Id. at 96. 
260.   See id. (citing United States v. Paolello, 951 F.2d 537 (3d Cir. 1991); see also United States 
v. Panter, 688 F.2d 268 (5th Cir. 1982) (discussing the imminence requirement needed for a duress 
defense).  
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2.    Necessity 
The United States Supreme Court has not provided the elements of a 
necessity defense; however, in United States v. Maxwell,261 the First Circuit 
determined that a necessity defense required a defendant to prove “that he 
(1) was faced with a choice of evils and chose the lesser evil, (2) acted to 
prevent imminent harm, (3) reasonably anticipated a direct causal 
relationship between his acts and the harm to be averted, and (4) had no 
legal alternative but to violate the law.”262  In United States v. Maxwell, the 
defendant was convicted of unauthorized entry into a naval installation.263  
The facts indicate that the defendant entered a United States naval station 
located on the island of Vieques, Puerto Rico in an attempt to disrupt live-
fire artillery exercises that the Navy planned to conduct on the island.264  
The defendant believed that the live-fire exercises would involve a Trident 
nuclear submarine.265  The defendant appealed his conviction on multiple 
grounds, including the trial court’s denial of the presentation of a necessity 
defense.266  The necessity defense that the defendant proposed ran as 
follows: the unlawful entry on the naval station designed to stop the 
exercise and the deployment of a nuclear submarine was a lesser evil than 
allowing the Navy to continue with the live-fire exercise; the harm was 
imminent because the defendant believed one of the submarines was in 
the immediate vicinity of the island; the defendant believed that 
committing the unlawful entry would halt the live-fire exercise leading to 
the dispersion of the nuclear submarine; and, finally, the defendant had 
previously taken other actions to no avail.267  As such, there was no other 
alternative but to trespass on the naval station.268  In analyzing the 
defendant’s appeal, the Maxwell court discussed the elements of a necessity 
defense as they applied to the facts of the defendant’s case.269   
As for the first element, the appeals court did not provide any 
meaningful analysis of the defendant’s claim that he had chosen the lesser 
 
261. United States v. Maxwell, 254 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2001). 
262. Id. at 27 (citing United States v. Turner, 44 F.3d 900 (10th Cir. 1995)). 
263. Id. at 23–24. 
264. See id. at 23 (noting the history of protests that have arisen as a product of politically 
controversial, live-fire artillery and bombardment exercises carried out on the island). 
265. Id. at 27. 
266. See id. at 24 (detailing Maxwell’s arguments concerning his appeal). 
 267.    See id. at 27. 
268. Id.  
269. Id. at 26–29. 
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of two evils.270  The court assumed, for the sake of argument, that the 
defendant’s claim—that he committed the unlawful entry onto the naval 
station because it was less of an evil than allowing the Navy to deploy a 
nuclear submarine and perform live-fire exercises on the island—was 
sufficient to carry the burden of production necessary to proceed with the 
necessity defense.271  The court was more skeptical of the defendant’s 
arguments regarding the three remaining elements.272 
Next, the court discussed the element of imminent harm.273  The court 
defined the term imminent harm as being one of “a real 
emergency . . . involving immediate danger to oneself or to a third 
party.”274  The court was dismissive of the defendant’s claim that the 
deployment of the nuclear submarine was an imminent harm.275  The 
court took apart the defendant’s claim of imminent harm in two steps.276  
It first determined that the defendant was unable to offer evidence that the 
submarine was in the area.277  Subsequently, the court found that even if 
the defendant had provided evidence that the submarine was in the area, 
without proof that the submarine was going to actually detonate anything, 
the defendant’s claims were insufficient to demonstrate an imminent 
harm.278 
After discussing the first and second elements of the necessity defense, 
the court turned to the third element.279  It stated that in order to show a 
reasonable anticipation of averting harm in the context of a protest, the 
“defendant must demonstrate [a] cause and effect between an act of 
protest and the achievement of the goal[.]”280  The court further 
 
270. See id. at 27 (foregoing any discussion of a two-evils analysis, and instead assuming that 
the requirement was met). 
271. See id. (“We assume, for argument’s sake, that Maxwell carried the entry-level burden of 
production on the first component (‘lesser of two evils’).”).  
 272.    See id. (discounting the last three elements of Maxwell’s defense). 
273. Id. at 27–28. 
274. Id. at 27. 
275. See id. (“[E]ven if Maxwell could have shown that a nuclear submarine was close at hand, 
it is doubtful that the mere presence of such a vessel, without some kind of realistic threat of 
detonation, would suffice to pose an imminent harm.”). 
276. See id. at 27–28 (addressing the elements of imminent harm and “reasonable anticipation 
of averting harm”). 
277. See id. (“The record contains no evidence to support Maxwell’s naked averment that the 
harm he feared was imminent.”).  
278. Id.  
279. Id. at 28. 
280. Id.  
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determined that the defendant did not present any evidence supporting a 
reasonable belief that his unlawful entry would cause the Navy to cancel 
the exercises and disperse the submarine.281  In its analysis, the court 
focused on the reasonableness aspect of whether the defendant could 
anticipate harm being averted.282  The court did not present a definition 
of reasonableness, but it did provide an example of what would not be 
reasonable behavior.283  Referring to a case that is factually similar to 
United States v. Maxwell, the court cited United States v. Montgomery,284 an 
Eleventh Circuit decision, that held it was not reasonable to believe that 
entering a nuclear launch site and vandalizing it would lead to nuclear 
disarmament.285 
Lastly, the Maxwell court discussed the legal alternative element.286  The 
court stated that in order for a necessity defense to succeed, a defendant 
must show that he violated the law because there was no legal 
alternative.287  The court expounded on this element by stating that the 
necessity defense does not arise from a choice of an action from all 
available actions.288  The defense is only available when a defendant’s 
actions are necessary and preclude all other options.289  The court placed 
a high burden on this element of the necessity defense when it asserted, 
“A defendant’s legal alternatives will rarely, if ever, be deemed exhausted 
when the harm of which he complains can be palliated by political 
action.”290  The Fifth Circuit addressed this element in United States v. 
Posada-Rios,291 by noting that a defendant’s subjective belief of whether 
alternatives were available was not the standard.292  The Maxwell court 
found that, because the defendant had not exhausted his legal alternatives, 
 
281. See id. (“Maxwell’s anticipation [was] pure conjecture, not [a] reasonable belief.”). 
282. See id. (“On this record, then, Maxwell could not reasonably have anticipated that his act 
of trespass would avert the harm that he professed to fear.”). 
283. See id. (finding trespass and temporary disruption could not reasonably ward off the harm 
the defendant intended to prevent). 
284. United States v. Montgomery, 772 F.2d 733 (11th Cir. 1985). 
285. Maxwell, 254 F.3d at 28 (citing Montgomery, 772 F.2d at 736). 
286. Id. at 28–29. 
287. Id. at 28. 
288. Id.  
289. See id. (describing the necessity defense as arising from an emergent crisis with only one 
course of action). 
290. Id. at 29. 
291. United States v. Posada-Rios, 158 F.3d 832 (5th Cir. 1998). 
292. Id. at 874. 
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he did not meet the burden of production on the fourth element of the 
necessity defense.293 
C.    Utilizing Duress and Necessity Defenses 
A defendant has a right to utilize an affirmative defense at trial, at the 
sentencing phase, or both.294  Regarding the right to utilize an affirmative 
defense at trial, the First Circuit Court of Appeals concluded, in 
United States v. Rodriguez,295 that if the defense theory is valid and the 
record contains evidence to support the theory, then a defendant is 
entitled to a jury instruction on the theory.296  In order to utilize a duress 
or necessity defense, it is necessary to clear two hurdles: (1) the defendant 
must present relevant evidence;297 and (2) the defendant must present 
evidence sufficient to support the burden of production.298  If both of 
these hurdles are cleared, then the issue of who—defense or 
prosecution—carries the burden of persuasion, arises.   
1.    Utilizing Duress and Necessity Defenses at Trial 
As noted above, a court must first determine whether the evidence to 
support a defense of duress or necessity is relevant.299  For evidence to be 
admissible, it must be relevant.300  Federal Rule of Evidence 401 states, 
“Evidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less 
probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of 
consequence in determining the action.”301  The United States Supreme 
Court has interpreted the Rule’s standard of relevance as being a liberal 
 
293. Maxwell, 254 F.3d at 28–29. 
294. See id. at 26 (finding a defendant has a broad right to utilize a defense); see also 
United States v. Amparo, 961 F.2d 288, 292 (1st Cir. 1992) (determining rejection of a duress defense 
by the jury does not preclude the judge from giving a lower sentence based on that defense).  But see 
United States v. Ruiz, 905 F.2d 499, 508–09 (1st Cir. 1990) (restating the view that a defendant 
cannot appeal a sentence based on the sentencing court’s refusal to depart from the appropriate 
sentencing guideline range). 
295. United States v. Rodriguez, 858 F.2d 809 (1st Cir. 1988). 
296. Id. at 812. 
297. See Maxwell, 254 F.3d at 26 (finding no right to present irrelevant evidence). 
298. Id. at 26. 
299. See id. (emphasizing the need that evidence be relevant in order to invoke a criminal 
defendant’s right to present such). 
300. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 587 (1993) (citing FED. R. EVID. 
402). 
301. FED. R. EVID. 401. 
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one.302  Trial judges make the determination of whether evidence is 
relevant or not.303 
After determining whether evidence is relevant or irrelevant, a trial court 
will then determine if the evidence is sufficient to support the burden of 
production.304  The United States Supreme Court has ruled that, in order 
to present evidence of a duress or necessity defense at trial, a defendant 
must “meet a minimum standard as to each element of the defense so that, 
if a jury finds it to be true, it would support an affirmative 
defense . . . .”305  The trial court determines the minimum standard a 
defendant must meet.306  In order to make the determination of whether 
the defendant has met the minimum standard, the trial court does not 
engage in fact-finding, but merely makes an inquiry into whether the 
evidence is legally sufficient.307  Courts have determined that evidence is 
legally sufficient when “it creates a genuine factual dispute.”308  Other 
courts have stated that evidence is legally sufficient when it is more than 
“flimsy or insubstantial.”309  In making this determination, courts will 
look at the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant.310  
Courts have generally described the evidence that is necessary to support 
the burden of production in broad strokes (i.e., “more than flimsy;” must 
create a triable issue); however, courts have determined that a defendant’s 
conclusory or self-serving statements are not sufficient to create a triable 
issue.311 
 
302. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 587. 
303. United States v. Diaz, 878 F.2d 608, 614 (2d Cir. 1989) (quoting United States v. Cruz, 
797 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 1986)). 
304.   See, e.g., United States v. Maxwell, 254 F.3d 21, 26 (1st Cir. 2001) (“Thus, when the 
proffer in support of an anticipated affirmative defense is insufficient as a matter of law to create a 
triable issue, a district court may preclude the presentation of that defense entirely.” (quoting United 
States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 414–15 (1980))). 
305. Bailey, 444 U.S. at 415.  
306. See United States v. Rodriguez, 858 F.2d 809, 812 (1st Cir. 1988) (“[T]he court’s function 
is to examine the evidence of record . . . to see if the proof, taken most hospitably to the accused, can 
plausibly support the theory of defense.”). 
307. Id.  
308. United States v. Ortiz, 804 F.2d 1161, 1164 (10th Cir. 1986). 
309. Id. at 1165 (quoting United States v. Nations, 764 F.2d 1073, 1080 (5th Cir. 1985)). 
310. United States v. Reyes, 645 F.2d 285, 287 (5th Cir. 1981) (citing United States v. Hill, 
626 F.2d 1301, 1304 (5th Cir. 1980)). 
311. Ortiz, 804 F.2d at 1165–66 (citing United States v. Kakley, 741 F.2d 1, 4 (1st. Cir. 1984), 
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 887 (1984)). 
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The last issue that must be addressed for a defendant to utilize a duress 
or necessity defense at trial is deciding which side will have to carry the 
burden of persuasion.  In In re Winship,312 the United States Supreme 
Court explicitly held that the Due Process Clause of the Constitution 
requires the prosecution to prove a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt.313  In McKelvey v. United States,314 the United States Supreme Court 
concluded that affirmative defenses must be set up and established by the 
side relying on the defense.315  In Dixon v. United States, the United States 
Supreme Court decided a case in which a petitioner contended that the 
trial court erroneously instructed the jury that she was required to prove a 
duress defense by a preponderance of the evidence instead of requiring the 
prosecution to carry the burden of persuasion beyond a reasonable 
doubt.316  The facts of the case indicate that the petitioner was indicted 
and convicted of making false statements linked to a firearm acquisition 
(18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6)) and receiving a firearm during the time she was 
under felony indictment (18 U.S.C. § 922(n)).317  At trial, the petitioner 
admitted to committing the offenses, but claimed she did so because her 
boyfriend threatened her with death or harm to her family if she did not 
purchase the weapons.318  The petitioner’s argument contained two 
assertions: (1) her duress defense “controverted the mens rea required for 
conviction” and, therefore, the prosecution was required to carry the 
burden of persuasion; and (2) modern common law requires the 
government to bear the burden of persuasion.319   
The Dixon Court addressed the petitioner’s arguments by analyzing the 
issue of who is required to carry the burden of persuasion.320  The Court 
began its analysis by noting that the statutes the petitioner was charged and 
convicted of violating contain a mens rea element.321  18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6) 
 
312. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). 
313. Id. at 364. 
314. McKelvey v. United States, 260 U.S. 353 (1922). 
315. See id. at 357 (reinforcing the notion that a party asserting a defense must bear the burden 
of proof on that defense). 
316. Dixon v. United States, 548 U.S. 1, 4–5 (2006). 
317. Id. at 3. 
318. Id. at 4 
319. Id. at 5. 
320. See id. at 5–17 (discussing the assignment of the burden upon either the government or 
the defendant). 
321. See id. at 5 (noting the crimes petitioner was convicted of require one to act “knowingly” 
or “willfully”). 
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requires the accused to have acted “knowingly” and 18 U.S.C. 
§ 924(a)(1)(D)322 requires the accused to have acted “willfully.”323  The 
Court, referencing In re Winship, asserted that the prosecution bore the 
burden of proving the mens rea elements beyond a reasonable doubt.324  
The Court determined, however, that the prosecution met its burden when 
the petitioner admitted in court, through her testimony, that she 
committed the crimes.325  In admitting that she committed the crimes, the 
petitioner argued that she was forced to commit the crimes and, therefore, 
did not meet the mens rea required by the statute.326  Nevertheless, the 
Court, citing United States v. Bailey, noted that affirmative defenses do not 
negate mens rea; instead, the defenses “allow . . . the defendant to ‘avoid 
liability . . . because coercive conditions or necessity negates a conclusion 
of guilt even though the necessary mens rea was present.’”327  The Court 
also supported its decision by noting that the crimes the petitioner was 
convicted of violating are statutory offenses that are not analogous to any 
common law crime, and that a duress defense does not disprove any 
elements of a statutory crime.328   
The Court then discussed how the burden of persuasion has been 
historically allocated in statutory offenses.329  It began its discussion by 
observing that federal crimes are exclusively created by statute and the 
elements of those crimes are defined by the legislature.330  The Court 
further affirmed that, for the crimes at hand, Congress defined the specific 
mental states as requiring the defendant to act “knowingly” or 
“willfully.”331  Furthermore, the Court determined that the prosecution is 
required to prove those specific mental states beyond a reasonable 
doubt.332  The Court, citing Patterson v. New York,333 indicated that “[t]he 
 
322. 18 U.S.C. § 922(n) does not contain a mens rea requirement, but 
18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(1)(D)—the sentencing provision of the statute—does.  See Dixon, 548 U.S. at 5 
(detailing the difference between the statutes). 
323. See Dixon, 548 U.S. at 5 (“[T]he term ‘willfully’ in § 924(a)(1)(D) requires a defendant to 
have ‘acted with knowledge that his conduct was unlawful.’”). 
324. Id. at 5–6 (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970)). 
325. Id. at 6. 
326. Id.  
327. Id. at 7 (citing United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 402 (1980)). 
328. Id.  
329. Id.  
330. Id.  
331. Id.  
332. Id. (citing Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 211 n.12 (1977)).  
333. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977). 
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applicability of the reasonable-doubt standard . . . has always been 
dependent on how a State defines the offense that is charged in any given 
case.”334  The Court then concluded its analysis of the petitioner’s 
argument—that a duress defense controverts the mens rea of the offense—
by finding that there is no constitutional basis for requiring the 
prosecution to carry the burden of persuasion.335   
The Dixon Court subsequently addressed whether modern common law 
requires the prosecution to disprove the petitioner’s duress defense 
beyond a reasonable doubt.336  The Court, citing both Patterson v. New 
York and Mullaney v. Wilbur,337 began its analysis by observing that 
common law requires that the defendant carry the burden of persuasion 
for affirmative defenses.338  The Court noted that the common law rule, 
in the duress defense context, is in accord with the doctrine that “where 
the facts with regard to an issue lie peculiarly in the knowledge of a party, 
that party has the burden of proving the issue.”339  The petitioner argued 
that “two important developments” supported her contention that 
modern law requires the government to bear the burden of persuasion: 
(1) the Supreme Court decision of Davis v. United States; and (2) the Model 
Penal Code.340   
The Court first addressed the petitioner’s reliance on Davis v. 
United States341—a United States Supreme Court decision requiring the 
government to carry the burden of persuasion on whether a defendant was 
sane.342  The Court found that Davis v. United States did not support the 
petitioner’s argument for multiple reasons.343  First, the Court noted that 
the Davis Court required the prosecution to prove the defendant’s sanity 
beyond a reasonable doubt because that evidence disproved an essential 
element of the murder charge.344  The Dixon Court thus dismissed the 
petitioner’s argument, finding that the evidence produced at trial did not 
 
334. Dixon, 548 U.S. at 7–8 (citing Patterson, 432 U.S. at 211 n.12). 
335. Id. at 8. 
336. Id.  
337. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975). 
338. Dixon, 548 U.S. at 8. 
339. Id. at 9 (citing 2 J. STRONG, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 415 (5th ed. 1999)). 
340. Id. at 8. 
341. Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469 (1895). 
342. Dixon, 548 U.S. at 8. 
343. See id. at 9–15 (distinguishing Davis from the present case and expounding on why Davis 
was not applicable). 
344. Id. at 11 (citing Davis, 165 U.S. at 378). 
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disprove the elements of the crimes she was convicted of.345  Second, the 
Dixon Court acknowledged that Davis v. United States may have 
“establish[ed] a general rule for federal prosecutions . . . that an accused is 
‘entitled to an acquittal of the specific crime charged if upon all the 
evidence there is reasonable doubt whether he was capable in law of 
committing crime.’”346  This rule, in effect, required the government to 
prove a defendant’s sanity beyond a reasonable doubt if a defendant was 
able to carry the burden of production as to his sanity.347  The Court then 
foreclosed the petitioner’s argument by noting that Leland v. Oregon348 
determined that the Davis rule was not mandated by the Constitution.349  
Furthermore, Congress had overruled Davis by creating a statute that 
required a defendant to carry the burden of persuasion as to “his insanity 
by clear and convincing evidence.”350  As such, the Court determined that 
the petitioner was unable to argue that the Davis decision was relevant to a 
duress defense argument.351  Lastly, the Dixon Court echoed its previous 
observation that all federal crimes are statutory and, as such, the Court 
must enforce the duress defense as contemplated by Congress in the 
context of the crimes at hand.352  The Court noted that Congress did not 
include a duress defense in the statute that the defendant was convicted of 
violating.353  Consequently, the Court assumed that Congress—familiar 
with the common law requirement that the defendant bear the burden of 
proving an affirmative defense and the Court’s holding in McKelvey v. 
United States—would expect courts to apply those same approaches to a 
duress defense.354 
The Court then addressed whether the Model Penal Code is evidence of 
a new common law rule that the government must bear the burden of 
persuasion and disprove a duress defense beyond a reasonable doubt.355  
The petitioner argued that the Model Penal Code placed the burden on the 
prosecution to disprove a duress defense beyond a reasonable doubt; that 
 
345. Id.  
346. Id. (quoting Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 797 (1952)). 
347. Id.  
348. Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952). 
349. Dixon, 548 U.S. at 12. 
350. Id.  
351. Id.  
352. Id.  
353. Id. at 13. 
354. Id. at 13–14. 
355. Id. at 15–17. 
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Congress was familiar with the Model Penal Code; and that Congress 
intended to model the statutory language for the crimes at hand after the 
Model Penal Code.356  The Court rejected the petitioner’s argument by 
noting that the statutory language of the crimes at hand did not adhere to 
the language of the Model Penal Code and, therefore, it was unlikely that 
Congress intended the Court to interpret the statutes through the lens of 
the Model Penal Code.357 
The Court concluded its analysis by finding that Congress could require 
the prosecution to disprove a duress defense beyond a reasonable doubt if 
it were to include such language in enacted legislations.358 
2.    Utilizing Duress and Necessity During Sentencing 
All hope is not lost if a defendant is unable to bring a duress or 
necessity defense to the jury.  As noted above, courts have recognized a 
defendant’s right to utilize a defense of duress when sentenced.359  
Defendants are allowed to argue, at the time of sentencing, that they 
committed a crime under duress or necessity regardless of whether or not 
the defense is sufficient to present to a jury.360  The United States 
Sentencing Commission recognized that duress and necessity can be 
utilized at sentencing, and included both defenses in the section of the 
United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual, which discusses grounds for 
departure.361  In United States v. Booker,362 the United States Supreme 
Court held that the United States Sentencing Guidelines are advisory, and 
that courts are no longer bound to apply the Guidelines when 
pronouncing a sentence.363  However, the Booker Court did make clear 
that a sentencing court must still consider the Guidelines as a factor when 
 
356. Id. at 15–16. 
357. Id. at 16. 
358. Id. at 17. 
359. United States v. Amparo, 961 F.2d 288, 292 (1st Cir. 1992). 
360. Id.  
361. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 5K2.11–5K2.12 (U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N 2016) (discussing grounds for downward departure based on evidence of duress or 
necessity). 
362. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
363. See id. at 264 (noting district courts are not required to apply the Guidelines during 
sentencing). 
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calculating a sentence.364  As such, a sentencing court must consider all 
relevant grounds for departure contained in the Guidelines Manual.365 
As noted above, the Guidelines Manual recognizes both duress and 
necessity as grounds for departure from a guideline sentence.366  In 
section 5K2.11, the Guidelines Manual discusses when a departure for a 
necessity defense may be appropriate.367  The relevant language contained 
in the Guidelines Manual states that it may be appropriate for a court to 
reduce a sentence when a defendant committed a crime out of necessity to 
avoid a greater harm.368  Much like the definition of necessity at the 
liability stage, the Guidelines do not indicate how to categorize levels of 
harm.369  However, the Guidelines require that the actions taken by the 
defendant “significantly diminish society’s interest in punishing the 
conduct.”370 
In section 5K2.12, the Guidelines Manual discusses when a duress 
defense is grounds for departing from the Guidelines.371  Similar to the 
finding made by the Amparo Court, the Guidelines state that a defense of 
duress may be used to argue for a reduced sentence even if the defense 
was not sufficient to amount to a complete defense.372  The Guidelines 
Manual states that any decrease in the sentence based on a duress claim 
should take into account: (1) the reasonableness of actions taken; (2) the 
defendant’s actions in proportion to the duress involved; and (3) the extent 
to which the defendant’s conduct was less harmful than what the 
defendant believed it to be.373  The Guidelines Manual limits any 
reduction of a sentence to cases that involve threat of physical injury, 
 
364. See id. at 259–60 (“The district courts, while not bound to apply the Guidelines, must 
consult those Guidelines and take them into account when sentencing.”). 
 365.    U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 5K2.11–5K2.12 (U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N 2016) (“Relevant distinctions not reflected in the guidelines probably will occur rarely and 
sentencing courts may take such unusual causes into account by departing from the guidelines.”).   
366. Id. 
367. See id. at § 5K2.11 (“Sometimes, a defendant may commit a crime in order to avoid a 
perceived grater harm”). 
368. Id.  
369. See Bedi, supra note 102, at 592 (“[T]he Guidelines make no reference to the kind of harm 
required to be averted.” (emphasis added)). 
370. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.11 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2016). 
371. Id. at § 5K2.12. 
372. Id; see United States v. Amparo, 961 F.2d 288, 292 (1st Cir. 1992). 
373. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.12 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2016). 
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substantial property damage, or similar injury that results from a third 
party’s unlawful actions.374 
V.    VIABILITY OF A DURESS OR NECESSITY DEFENSE GOING FORWARD 
Part IV defined and analyzed the defenses of duress and necessity as 
utilized in the federal court system.  The question then becomes: Where 
does the current state of the law pertaining to a duress defense leave the 
hypothetical case of Roberto?  Under the current state of the law, can 
Roberto find justice or is he relegated to being punished for his forced 
involvement in a crime?  Court analysis indicates that a duress defense is 
not very successful at trial or during the sentencing phase.375  The main 
issue with a duress defense in this context is that, in the majority of 
situations, a judge or jury is forced to weigh the uncorroborated testimony 
of a defendant, who has been caught breaking the law, against the evidence 
of the crime (i.e., drug loads or other tangible evidence).376  There is rarely 
any tangible evidence to corroborate the defendant’s story that he was 
forced to participate in the crime.377  In the case of Roberto, even if he 
was willing to provide testimony that he only participated in the crime 
because his family was threatened, will he be willing to provide sufficient 
testimony in light of the fact that his family is still in danger?  The 
remainder of the Comment will analyze Roberto’s case under the state of 
the current law and suggest arguments that may offer defendants, in 
situations similar to Roberto’s, a way to find justice. 
A.    Is a Duress Defense Viable? 
Assuming—based on the hypothetical—that Roberto will be charged 
with possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance 
(21 U.S.C. § 841),378 the prosecution will have to prove beyond a 
 
374. Id.  
375. Burnett, supra note 91. 
376. Id.  
377. See id. (describing the defense as a trendy one that rarely works but is nonetheless used in 
hopes that it will work). 
378. It is also likely that Roberto would be charged with conspiracy to possess with intent to 
distribute a controlled substance (21 U.S.C. § 846), as prosecutors frequently add-on this charge in 
order to increase leverage on the defendant.  Daniel Medwed, Memo to Marty Walsh: Why  
Prosecutors Love to Charge Defendants with Conspiracy, WGBH NEWS, (Aug. 10, 2016), 
http://www.news.wgbh.org/2016/08/10/news/memo-marty-walsh-why-prosecutors-love-charge-
defendants-conspiracy [https://perma.cc/GP9W-HL5Q].  A conspiracy charge would beg the 
question: whether Roberto, acting under duress, could possibly be in agreement with the individuals 
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reasonable doubt that Roberto knowingly or intentionally possessed the 
drugs with intent to distribute them.379  Roberto will be forced to decide 
if he wants to plead guilty, and be eligible to receive a benefit, such as a 
sentence reduction for accepting responsibility, or fight the charge by 
attempting to present evidence of duress, which is considered an 
affirmative defense.380  He must consider the possibility that if he is 
unsuccessful in his duress defense, he will not receive any credit at 
sentencing for acceptance of responsibility, which will likely lead to a 
longer sentence.381  The following analysis is based on Roberto’s 
hypothetical decision to utilize a duress or necessity defense. 
As discussed in Part IV, if Roberto chooses to assert an affirmative 
defense, he must first offer relevant evidence that is sufficient to support 
the burden of production.382  It is beneficial to Roberto that courts have 
interpreted the standard of relevance liberally.383  Thus, Roberto’s 
testimony of how he was forced to smuggle drugs into the United States is 
relevant in that “it has [a] tendency to make a fact more or less 
probable . . . .”384   
A bigger concern for Roberto is his ability to meet the burden of 
production.  Roberto will likely be forced to attempt to carry the burden of 
production based solely on his testimony, which creates a problem.  
Although courts will look at the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
 
that coerced him into the commission of the crime.  In United States v. Cessa, the Fifth Circuit Court 
of Appeals addressed this issue.  United States v. Cessa 861 F.3d 121, 130–133 (5th Cir. 2017).  The 
court noted that the defendant must be allowed to tell his story.  See id. at 130 (“Defendants charged 
with participating in a conspiracy to launder money may argue that they did not ‘join[] the 
conspiracy[.]’” (quoting United States v. Cessa 785 F.3d 165, 175 (5th Cir. 2015))).  The defendant 
argued that he was not part of a conspiracy by directly attacking the element of conspiracy that 
requires a specific intent to join a conspiracy.  The court, in its decision to remand the case, pointed 
out that the defendant was not arguing that he joined the conspiracy under duress; instead, the 
defendant was arguing that he was involved with the Cartels (conspirators) out of fear.  Id.  
379. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2012). 
380. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(a)(1) (listing the pleas available for a criminal defendant); see also 
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1(A) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2016) (“If the 
defendant clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his offense, decrease the offense level 
by [two] levels.”). 
381. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINE MANUAL § 3E1.1 cmt. 2 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 
2016). 
382. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 587 (1993) (citing FED. R. EVID. 
401); see United States v. Maxwell, 254 F.3d 21, 26 (1st Cir. 2001) (explaining a defendant’s duty to 
present relevant evidence in support of an affirmative defense). 
383. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 587. 
384. FED. R. EVID. 401(a). 
44
St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 49 [2018], No. 2, Art. 5
https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol49/iss2/5
  
2018] COMMENT 505 
defendant, courts have stated that a defendant’s self-serving statements are 
not sufficient to meet the minimum standard.385  However, in United States 
v. Contento-Pachon—a case directly on point with the case at hand—the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision that the 
defendant had not offered sufficient evidence to support a duress 
defense.386  The Contento-Pachon court did not discuss the type of evidence 
offered in the case; however, the court constantly referenced Contento-
Pachon’s testimony when making the determination that the evidence 
offered was sufficient to support a duress defense.387  Furthermore, the 
Contento-Pachon court found that “[f]actfinding is usually a function of the 
jury, and the trial court rarely rules on a defense as a matter of law.”388  
Relying on Contento-Pachon, Roberto’s testimony that he was forced to bring 
drugs into the United States creates a genuine factual dispute and, thereby, 
is arguably sufficient to carry his burden of production.   
As discussed in Part IV,389 Roberto must carry the burden of 
production for each element of the duress or necessity defense.390  The 
first element of the duress defense requires that the defendant act under 
immediate threat of death or serious bodily injury.391  In light of the 
narrow definition of what constitutes an immediate threat, it may be 
difficult for Roberto to meet the immediate-threat standard.392  The 
hypothetical facts indicate that Roberto’s family was implicitly threatened 
and then, days later, he smuggled the drugs into the United States.  
However, Roberto has a viable argument when viewed through the lens 
supplied by the Contento-Pachon court.  Much like the hypothetical case at 
hand, Mr. Contento-Pachon and his family were threatened with bodily 
harm if he did not smuggle drugs into the United States.393  The Contento-
 
385. United States v. Ortiz, 804 F.2d 1161, 1164–66 (10th Cir. 1986). 
386. See United States v. Contento-Pachon, 723 F.2d 691, 693 (9th Cir. 1984) (“We reverse 
because there was sufficient evidence of duress to present a triable issue of fact.”). 
387. See id. at 693–95 (analyzing the elements of duress through the defendant’s testimony). 
388. Id. at 693. 
389.    Supra, Part IV. 
390. See Contento-Pachon, 72 F.2d at 693 (“There are three elements of the duress defense: 
(1) an immediate threat of death or serious bodily injury, (2) a well-grounded fear that the threat will 
be carried out, and (3) no reasonable opportunity to escape the threatened harm.”). 
391. Dixon v. United States, 548 U.S. 1, 4 n.2 (2006). 
392. See Contento-Pachon, 72 F.2d at 694 (“The element of immediacy requires that there be 
some evidence that the threat of injury was present, immediate, or impending.”). 
393. See id. at 693 (“Jorge told Contento-Pachon that his failure to cooperate would result in 
the death of his wife and three-year-old child.”). 
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Pachon court acknowledged that “a veiled threat of future unspecified 
harm” did not satisfy the definition of immediate.394  The court 
determined, however, that the evidence provided supported the argument 
that future threats to Mr. Contento-Pachon and his family would have 
come to fruition in the form of immediate and harsh consequences if he 
had refused to cooperate.395  The court supported its conclusion by 
noting that the man that threatened Mr. Contento-Pachon was deeply 
involved in the drug business and that large amounts of money were 
involved in the transaction.396  The court also indicated that the man 
threatened Mr. Contento-Pachon’s wife and child even though he had 
evidently never met them.397 
As previously discussed, the first element of a duress defense also 
requires that the threat of death or serious bodily injury be well-
grounded.398  In Part II of this Comment,399 the discussion led to the 
conclusion that Mexican Cartels are violent and more than capable of 
carrying out threats of violence.  Roberto’s testimony—that the men who 
coerced him into participating in a crime appeared to be working for a 
large well-organized group—would support the argument that his fear was 
reasonable and well-grounded.400  In light of the Contento-Pachon court’s 
analysis, Roberto has an excellent argument that the implied threats 
regarding his family—made by those men—are sufficient to qualify as 
immediate and in the nature of death or serious bodily injury.   
The second element of the duress defense requires that Roberto not 
have recklessly or negligently placed himself in a situation in which he 
would be forced to commit a crime.401  The facts presented in the 
hypothetical indicate that Roberto was walking home from work and had 
no previous contact with the men that threatened him.  Roberto 
committed the crime two days after the initial threat.  Therefore, because 
 
394. Id. at 694 (citing R.I. Recreation Ctr., Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 177 F.2d 603, 605 
(1st Cir. 1949)). 
395. Id.  
396. Id.  
397. See id. at 693–94 (detailing how the man who threatened the defendant “mentioned facts 
about Contento-Pachon’s personal life, including private details which Contento-Pachon had never 
mentioned to” him). 
398. Id. at 693. 
399.    Supra, Part II. 
400. See Contento-Pachon, 72 F.2d at 695 (concluding the defendant offered credible evidence 
that he acted under immediate and well-grounded threats). 
401. Dixon v. United States, 548 U.S. 1, 4 n.2 (2006). 
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the crime was committed after Roberto and his family had already been 
threatened, the second element would likely be met in Roberto’s favor. 
The third element requires that Roberto have had no reasonable legal 
alternative to violating the law.402  The Contento-Pachon case is on point 
regarding this issue.  In Contento-Pachon, the defendant received a threat and 
did not act for several weeks after the threat.403  The district court 
observed that the defendant had plenty of time to alert the authorities or 
leave the area.404  However, the court of appeals noted that the evidence 
offered was sufficient to create a fact issue regarding whether or not the 
defendant was able to go to the police since they were known for being 
corrupt.405  Additionally, as discussed above, in a separate case, the 
First Circuit determined that a defendant was unable to claim a duress 
defense because he did not go to the police.406  In R.I. Recreation Center, 
Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., the court found that the police force was 
adequately staffed and equipped to take on the armed individuals that had 
threatened the defendant.407  In Part II of this Comment,408 however, the 
analysis led to the conclusion that the Mexican Government is not 
adequately staffed or equipped to take on the Mexican Cartels.  As such, 
both Contento-Pachon and R.I. Recreation Center, Inc. provide support for 
Roberto’s claim that he had no reasonable legal alternative to violating the 
law. 
The fourth element requires that Roberto show an anticipated direct 
causal relationship between bringing the drugs into the United States and 
avoidance of his family’s death.409  As discussed in Part IV,410 United 
States v. Alston focused on the imminence of the harm to determine if there 
was a direct causal relationship.411  Therefore, because Roberto has a 
 
402. Id.  
403. See Contento-Pachon, 723 F.2d at 693 (indicating the defendant did not act immediately 
after the threats were made, but rather met with the man who threatened him on two subsequent 
occasions before carrying out the crime). 
404. Id. at 694 (“The district court found that because Contento-Pachon was not physically 
restrained prior to the time he swallowed the balloons, he could have sought help from the police or 
fled.”).  
405. Id. at 693 (“Contento-Pachon testified that he did not contact the police because he 
believe[d] that the Bogota police [were] corrupt and that they [were] paid off by drug traffickers.”).  
406. R.I. Recreation Ctr., Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 177 F.2d 603, 605–06 (1st Cir. 1949). 
407. Id. at 606. 
408.    Supra, Part II. 
409. Dixon v. United States, 548 U.S. 1, 4 n.2 (2006). 
410.    Supra, Part IV.  
411. United States v. Alston, 526 F.3d 91, 95–96 (3d Cir. 2008). 
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strong argument that he faced imminent harm and can provide testimony 
to that point, he meets the fourth required element of the duress defense. 
The foregoing analysis supports a strong argument that Roberto would 
be able to present or proffer evidence sufficient to prove each element of a 
duress defense, thereby carrying his burden of production.412  The 
determination of whether Roberto has carried this burden of production, 
however, will likely be made by the presiding judge prior to trial.413  If the 
presiding judge rules that Roberto has carried the burden of production, 
Dixon v. United States then requires that Roberto carry the burden of 
persuasion.414  The Sixth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Johnson415 
provides guidance regarding at what point the defense must be presented 
to the jury: “Where a defendant claims an affirmative defense, and that 
‘defense finds some support in the evidence and in the law,’ the defendant 
is entitled to have the claimed defense discussed in the jury 
instructions.”416  The Johnson court further noted that the burden is met 
“even when the supporting evidence is weak or of doubtful 
credibility[.]”417  Therefore, it is likely that Roberto would be able to get a 
jury instruction that recognizes his assertion of a duress defense. 
B.    Is a Necessity Defense Viable? 
In Part IV418 it was indicated that the necessity defense has traditionally 
only been available when the coercion originated from a physical force of 
 
412. In United States v. Estrada-Monzon, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals stated, “Because 
duress is an affirmative defense, a defendant must present evidence of each of the elements of the 
defense before it may be presented to the jury.”  No. 16-40542, 2017 WL 2813855, at *3 (5th Cir. 
June 28, 2017) (citing United States v. Posada-Rios, 158 F.3d 832, 873 (5th Cir. 1998)); see also United 
States v. Montgomery, 772 F.2d 733, 736 (11th Cir. 1985) (“In order to have [an affirmative] defense 
submitted to a jury, a defendant must first produce or proffer evidence sufficient to prove the 
essential elements of the defense.” (quoting United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 412 n.9 (1980))). 
413. The Government is likely, pursuant to FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(b), to file a motion in limine 
to prohibit the presentation of the defense to the jury.  If, during the hearing, Roberto is unable to 
prove each element of the defense, he will be unable to present the defense to the jury.  See United 
States v. Johnson, 416 F.3d 464, 468 (6th Cir. 2005) (“When, as in this case, the issue is raised in a 
pretrial motion, the rule is to be applied just the same: if the defendant’s proffered evidence is legally 
insufficient to support [an affirmative] defense, the trial judge should not allow its presentation to the 
jury.” (quoting United States v. Villegas, 899 F.2d 1324, 1343 (2d Cir. 1990))). 
414. Dixon, 548 U.S. at 17. 
415. United States v. Johnson, 416 F.3d 464 (6th Cir. 2005). 
416. Id. at 467 (citing United States v. Garner, 529 F.2d 962, 970 (6th Cir. 1976)). 
417. Id. (quoting Garner, 529 F.2d at 970). 
418.    Supra, Part IV. 
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nature.419  The elements of a necessity defense were also discussed and 
shown to mirror those of a duress defense with slight variances: (1) a 
choice of evils; (2) the actions were to prevent imminent harm; 
(3) reasonable anticipation of direct causal relationship between the acts 
and the harm to be avoided; and (4) no legal alternative to violating the 
law.420  The defendant in Contento-Pachon argued that he violated 
21 U.S.C. §841(a)(1) because he chose the evil of bringing drugs into the 
United States over the death of his family.421  Once again the court’s 
decision in Contento-Pachon provides insight as to whether or not Roberto 
has a viable necessity defense.  The Contento-Pachon court did not address 
each element of the necessity defense in affirming the trial court’s denial of 
the defendant’s necessity argument.422  Instead, the court denied the 
defendant’s arguments on two grounds: (1) the defendant’s acts were 
coerced by a human force instead of the requisite physical force of nature; 
and (2) the defendant was not acting in the interest of the general 
welfare.423  In its analysis, the court recognized the traditional distinction 
that separates duress and necessity (human coercion vs. physical force of 
nature).424  The court then observed that modern courts have “blur[red] 
the distinction between duress and necessity[,]” but ultimately determined 
that the traditional view was appropriate and decided that the defendant 
was precluded from using a necessity defense.425  The court’s holding in 
Contento-Pachon is directly on point with Roberto’s case and forecloses an 
argument that a necessity defense is viable.426 
C.    Arguments for Change 
This Comment has attempted to frame the effects that the Mexican 
Cartels have on the United States criminal justice system.  The Cartel’s 
ability to control areas of Mexico and force individuals to participate in 
 
419. United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers Coop., 532 U.S. 483, 490 (2001) (“The 
[necessity] defense ‘traditionally covered the situation where physical forces beyond the actor’s 
control rendered illegal conduct the lesser of two evils’” (quoting United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 
394, 410 (1980))). 
420. United States v. Maxwell, 254 F.3d 21, 27 (1st Cir. 2001). 
421. United States v. Contento-Pachon, 723 F.2d 691, 695 (9th Cir. 1984). 
422. See id. (omitting any discussion of the elements of the defense). 
423. Id.  
424. Id.  
425. Id. 
426. Id. at 695–96 (holding the necessity defense was correctly excluded under facts similar to 
those at hand). 
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crime is one of the areas that affects the system.427  Ordinary men and 
women live in constant fear of being co-opted into a life of crime with 
little to no recourse.428  These men and women are unable to flee, or turn 
to authorities for help, leaving little choice but to accept the silver or take 
the lead. 
The United States Supreme Court once asserted that, “[t]he doctrines of 
actus reus, mens rea, insanity, mistake, justification, and duress have 
historically provided the tools for a constantly shifting adjustment of the 
tension between the evolving aims of the criminal law and changing 
religious, moral, philosophical, and medical views of the nature of 
man.”429  The Mexican Cartel’s evolution has affected the criminal justice 
system in more ways than one.  This is the time to use the aforementioned 
tools to make some adjustments by reconsidering the law pertaining to the 
defenses of duress and necessity.  Two solutions that would serve to adjust 
the tension are: (1) shifting the burden of persuasion to the government, and 
(2) redefining the necessity defense.  Making either one of these changes 
would provide additional tools to assist a defendant that has been forced 
to participate in crime. 
1.    Shifting the Burden of Persuasion 
The United States criminal justice system was developed with the goal 
of “safeguard[ing] men from dubious and unjust convictions, with 
resulting forfeitures of life, liberty and property.”430  In support of this 
goal, the United States Supreme Court has interpreted the Constitution as 
requiring prosecutors to prove “beyond a reasonable doubt every fact 
necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.”431  In Speiser 
v. Randall,432 the Court stated that in litigation there is a margin of error 
(represented by error in fact finding) that the defendant and the 
prosecution must take into account.433  The Court first observed that the 
margin of error is reduced for the defendant by placing the burden of 
 
427. See Burnett, supra note 91 (detailing the method by which traffickers have been forcibly 
recruiting illegal immigrants to backpack drugs into the United States). 
428. Id. (describing how Mexican drug cartels force immigrants to smuggle drugs into the 
United States, and if they resist, kill them). 
429. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 536 (1968). 
430. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970). 
431. Id. at 363–64. 
432. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958). 
433. Id. at 525. 
50
St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 49 [2018], No. 2, Art. 5
https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol49/iss2/5
  
2018] COMMENT 511 
persuasion on the prosecution, resulting in increased protection of the 
defendant’s liberty.434  The Court then stated, “Due process commands 
that no man shall lose his liberty unless the Government has borne the 
burden of . . . convincing the factfinder of his guilt.”435 Although the 
Court did not address allocating the burden of persuasion to prove an 
affirmative defense, the concept is still relevant.   
In Dixon v. United States, discussed at length in Part IV,436 Justice Breyer 
wrote a dissent attacking the majority’s decision as rigid and formalistic.437  
The Supreme Court’s majority decision in Dixon v. United States places the 
burden of persuasion on the defendant when presenting a duress defense, 
thereby requiring him to convince the jury that he was forced to 
participate under threat of death or serious bodily harm.438  The court’s 
majority opinion explicitly found that there is no constitutional 
requirement that the burden of persuasion for a duress defense be 
allocated to the defendant or the prosecution,439 and, as such, Congress 
has the prerogative to legislatively allocate the burden where it sees fit.440  
The majority decision then stated that because Congress had not exercised 
its prerogative, it was up to the Court to “effectuate the affirmative 
defense of duress as Congress ‘may have contemplated’ it . . . .”441  Citing 
the “long-established common-law rule,” the majority held that defendants 
are to bear the burden of proving duress defenses.442   
In Justice Breyer’s vigorous and lengthy dissent, he argues that the 
burden of persuasion pertaining to a duress defense should be borne by 
the prosecution.443  Justice Breyer agrees with the majority that the 
Constitution does not require that the burden of persuasion be allocated to 
one party or the other, and that such may be allocated by Congress “as it 
 
434. Id. at 525–26. 
435. Id. at 526. 
436.    Supra, Part IV. 
437.   Dixon v. United States, 548 U.S. 1, 21 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“To believe that 
Congress intended the placement of such burdens to vary from statute to statute and time to time is 
both unrealistic and risks unnecessary complexity, jury confusion, and unfairness.”).  
438. Id. at 17. 
439. Id. at 8. 
440. Id. at 17. 
441. Id. (quoting United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Coop., 532 us 483, 491 n.3 
(2001)).  
442. Id.  
443. Id. at 21 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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sees fit.”444  However, he argues that because there is no constitutional 
requirement to allocate the burden, and because Congress is silent on the 
issue (noting this is congressional norm), the Court is free to determine 
which side should carry the burden.445  Justice Breyer argues that 
congressional silence is an invitation for the Court to allocate the burdens 
pertaining to affirmative defenses by “taking full account of the 
subsequent need for that law to evolve through judicial practice informed 
by reason and experience.”446  Justice Breyer asserts that, unlike the 
majority, he does not believe that Congress intended the courts to apply a 
one-size-fits-all determination of how the burden of persuasion should be 
allocated.447  Justice Breyer’s statement aligns with the view that Congress 
intended the courts to allocate the burden of persuasion, not in a blanket 
fashion but, instead, always looking toward the protection of a defendant’s 
liberty.   
Justice Breyer continues his argument that the prosecution should bear 
the burden of persuasion for a duress defense based on multiple reasons: 
(1) the question of duress is similar to mens rea, which is always allocated to 
the prosecution to carry the burden of persuasion; (2) in the past, federal 
courts have allocated the burden of persuasion for affirmative defenses 
(including duress) to the government; and (3) in order to prevent juror 
confusion, the burden of persuasion for duress should be carried by the 
government, thereby treating it the same the defenses of mens rea, actus reus, 
mistake, and self-defense.448  Of these three reasons, the most compelling 
argument the dissent offers—for the allocation of the burden of 
persuasion for affirmative defenses on the government—is based on 
precedent.  The dissent notes that prior to the majority’s decision in Dixon, 
most federal courts (for federal crimes) allocated the burden of persuasion 
 
444. Id. 
445. Id. at 21–22.  The Supreme Court has previously acknowledged that legislatures may 
allocate the burden of persuasion for affirmative defenses.  In Patterson v. New York, the Court held 
that the New York statute that required the defendant to carry the burden of persuasion for a 
common law heat of passion defense did not violate constitutional due process.  Patterson v. New 
York, 432 U.S. 197, 205 (1977).  The Court determined that legislatures have the prerogative to 
allocate the burden of persuasion as long as the statute does not offend a fundamental principle of 
justice.  Id. at 201–02. 
446. Dixon, 548 U.S. at 22. (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
447. See id. (insisting that the determination should begin with common law and evolve 
through reason and experience). 
448. Id. at 22–29. 
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to disprove a duress defense to the government.449  Similarly, in Mullaney 
v. Wilbur, the United States Supreme Court also required that the 
government prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant did not act 
in the heat of passion if the issue was presented.450  In the Court’s 
decision, it noted that the practical effect of its holding was the same as 
requiring the prosecution to disprove a defendant’s claim of self-
defense.451  While the Court’s holding in Mullaney v. Wilbur has never been 
directly overruled, when viewed through the lens of Patterson v. New York, 
the position that the government (as a matter of constitutional due 
process) should carry the burden of persuasion for a duress defense is 
diminished.  The Patterson and Mullaney decisions do, however, determine 
that the burden of persuasion for a duress defense is a matter of legislative 
prerogative.452  As previously noted, Congress has not legislatively 
allocated the burden of persuasion for a federal duress defense.  This 
brings the argument back to Justice Breyer’s main point: in the absence of 
congressional allocation, the Court is free to determine which side should 
carry the burden.453  Justice Breyer’s argument—that at one point most 
federal courts required the government to carry the burden of 
 
449. Id. at 24–27.  Prior to the Dixon Court’s decision, most federal circuit courts placed the 
burden on the government to disprove an affirmative defense.  See United States v. Arthurs, 73 F.3d 
444, 448 (1st Cir. 1996) (“When a predicate warranting a duress instruction has been laid, the 
government is saddled with the additional burden of showing beyond a reasonable doubt that a 
defendant’s criminal acts were not the product of duress.”); United States v. Talbot, 78 F.3d 1183, 
1186 (7th Cir. 1996) (asserting, unless a statute dictates otherwise, that “the burden of proof remains 
on the government to negate beyond a reasonable doubt the affirmative defenses properly raised by 
the defendant”); United States v. Simpson, 979 F.2d 1282, 1287 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding the 
government responsible for disproving a defense beyond a reasonable doubt once a defendant meets 
the burden of production for a coercion defense); United States v. Falcon, 766 F.2d 1469, 1477 
(10th Cir. 1985) (“Coercion is an affirmative defense which the government must disprove beyond a 
reasonable doubt only after the issue has been raised.”); United States v. Mitchell, 725 F.2d 832, 836 
(2d Cir. 1983) (stating “general federal practice” requires the prosecution to disprove a duress 
defense beyond a reasonable doubt); United States v. Campbell, 675 F.2d 815, 821 (6th Cir. 1982) 
(recognizing the prosecution must disprove coercion beyond a reasonable doubt if the defendant 
meets the burden of production); Johnson v. United States, 291 F.2d 150, 157 (8th Cir. 1961) 
(determining the Government has the burden to prove all elements of the crime and, if the defendant 
was coerced into committing the crime, then the criminal intent required to convict would be 
insufficient). 
450. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 702–04 (1975). 
451. Id. at 702. 
452. See Dixon, 548 U.S. at 21 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Where Congress speaks about burdens 
of proof, we must, of course, follow what it says.”). 
453. Id. at 22. 
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persuasion—is a powerful argument that weighs in favor of the Court 
allocating the burden of persuasion for defenses of duress.  
Commentators have stated that theories of justification have evolved 
over time and that today the theory requires the state to “justly punish only 
those individuals whose violation of the law is morally blameworthy.”454  
The majority’s rigid and formalistic decision in Dixon does not comport 
with an “increased protection of a defendant’s liberty,” nor does it protect 
an individual like Roberto that is arguably morally blameworthy.  By 
shifting the burden of persuasion to disprove a defendant’s duress defense 
to the government, the margin of error will be reduced, resulting in an 
increased protection of the defendant’s liberty. 
2.    Allowing the Necessity Defense 
When an individual is forced to participate in a crime by a cartel, courts 
should allow a defense of necessity to be argued, thereby providing 
another avenue of defense for the defendant.  As previously discussed, the 
court in United States v. Contento-Pachon denied the defendant’s use of a 
necessity defense, thus limiting the defendant to a defense of duress.455  
Citing the traditional definition of necessity as requiring the criminal acts 
to be coerced by physical forces, the court found that the defendant could 
not argue the necessity defense.456  The court, however, noted that 
modern courts have blurred the distinction between necessity and 
duress.457   
In United States v. Bailey, the United States Supreme Court reinforced the 
notion that modern cases have blurred the distinction between the 
defenses of necessity and duress.458  The facts of the Bailey case indicate 
that the defendants fled a prison because of the horrible conditions (i.e., 
beatings, lack of medical care, and sexual attacks) that they faced inside the 
prison.459  The defendants attempted to argue both duress and necessity 
at trial, but the judge denied the defenses because the defendants did not 
immediately turn themselves in to authorities after they had escaped the 
 
454. George P. Fletcher, Two Kinds of Legal Rules: A Comparative Study of Burden-Of-Persuasion 
Practices in Criminal Cases, 77 YALE L.J. 880, 888 (1968). 
455. United States v. Contento-Pachon, 723 F.2d 691, 695 (9th Cir. 1984). 
456. Id.  
457. Id.  
458. United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 410 (1980). 
459. Id. at 398. 
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prison.460  The appeals court reversed the trial court’s decision because 
the defendants had not been allowed to argue duress and necessity.461  
The Bailey Court, in its review of the appeals court’s decision, commented 
that the lower court had “discarded the labels of ‘duress’ and ‘necessity’” in 
its analysis of the defense.462  The Court noted that the appeals court had 
instead focused on whether the defendants had been faced with a choice 
of evils.463  The Court then stated that neither the duress nor the necessity 
defense could be used “if there was a reasonable, legal alternative to 
violating the law.”464  Consequently, the Court reversed the appeals 
court’s decision because it determined that the defendants had not 
adduced evidence to support the argument that escape was the only legal 
alternative.465  The Court then observed that the focus of the appeals 
court was not on whether the coercion was caused by a human or natural 
force of nature, but rather on whether the defendants had been forced to 
make a choice between evils.466  The Bailey Court had every opportunity 
to disallow the defendants’ necessity argument based on lack of a “natural 
force” requirement.  The Court, however, refused to restrict the necessity 
defense to the traditional definition, thereby implying that the necessity 
defense would be available in a prison escape case.467  Justice Blackmun, 
writing for the dissent, stated that the majority implicitly recognized that 
duress and necessity were available as defenses for the crime of prison 
escape.468  The Court failed to preclude the defendants in Bailey from 
making a necessity defense even though they did not face a natural 
force.469  The Bailey Court’s implicit recognition that a defendant could 
 
460. Id. at 399–400. 
461. Id. at 394. 
462. Id. at 410. 
463. See id. (describing the decisions of lower courts and the common law view of the 
necessity defense as a “choice of evils” argument). 
464. Id.  
465. Id. at 417. 
466. Id. at 410. 
467. See id. at 409–14 (discussing the traditional definition of necessity as a defense and 
analyzing the issue of escape from a prison where inmates are fleeing adverse additional conditions, 
as opposed to the confinement itself). 
468. See id. at 425 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“Although the Court declines to address the 
issue, it at least implies that it would recognize the common-law defenses of duress and necessity to 
the federal crime of prison escape, if the appropriate prerequisites for assertion of either defense 
were met.”). 
469. See id. at 435 (“The case for recognizing the duress or necessity defenses is even more 
compelling when it is society, rather than private actors, that creates the coercive conditions.”). 
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utilize a necessity defense in the context of a prison escape lends support 
to the argument that an individual being threatened by the cartels could 
also make the same argument.470  Courts today should eschew the 
traditional application of the necessity defense and embrace the Bailey 
Court’s implicit recognition that a crime can be committed out of necessity 
even if no forces of nature are present. 
Broadening the scope of when the necessity defense would be 
applicable provides the defendant with an additional avenue of defense 
that may increase his chances of achieving a just result.  Admittedly, this 
change may not result in substantial benefits to a defendant; however, 
proving the first element of necessity—as opposed to the first element of 
duress—could provide enough of a nuance to allow the defendant to 
succeed.  An argument that the defendant committed the crime after 
choosing the lesser of two evils is likely less burdensome to make than 
proving the crime was committed due to imminent threat of death or 
serious bodily injury.  As previously discussed in the case of Roberto, and 
for defendants in similar circumstances, a defense of duress would require 
proof that he was acting under threat of serious bodily injury or death; 
whereas a necessity defense would allow an argument that he chose the 
lesser of two evils (i.e. brought the drugs into the United States to save his 
wife and child from dying).  It is reasonable to acknowledge that a juror 
would be more likely to find that Roberto chose the lesser of two evils.   
An individual who commits a crime because he or his family will be 
killed by the cartels has a similar or better “choice of evils” argument than 
someone escaping prison to escape a beating or substandard medical care.  
Courts should allow defendants who, like Roberto, are forced to commit 
crimes out of necessity to use the defense of necessity.  
VI.    CONCLUSION 
Mexican Cartels have had an effect on the United States criminal justice 
system for many years.  The effect has become more substantial as the 
cartels have transitioned from operating mainly inside of Mexico to 
becoming transnational criminal organizations.  As the TCOs have 
become more powerful and more diverse, the United States criminal 
justice system has become burdened with an overwhelming number of 
cases and prisoners that are connected with the cartels.  Defendants with 
 
470. See id. at 412–13 (analyzing the necessity defense in the context of inmates escaping from 
prison to avoid additional adverse conditions). 
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cartel ties that are arrested and brought into the criminal justice system 
have been shown to work voluntarily and, unfortunately, involuntarily for 
the cartels.  Since the inception of our nation, the United States criminal 
justice system has evolved and continues to evolve in order to ensure that 
each defendant’s life and liberty are protected.  The system’s evolution also 
serves to efficiently prosecute and punish defendants that break the laws 
of the United States.  Current law does not properly take into account the 
extreme business model that the Mexican TCOs use to ensure that their 
business is successful.  Individuals that fall under the Plata o Plomo choice 
are forced to choose between participating in crime or losing their life.  
The current state of the law pertaining to duress and necessity needs to be 
changed to ensure that each and every defendant’s liberty is protected and 
justice is available for everyone.  In 1868, the Supreme Court chose to use 
“common sense” when implying a necessity argument.  Federal courts 
should now choose “common sense” in the application of duress and 
necessity defenses for individuals that really have no choice at all. 
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